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Monetary Policy Transparency in Pakistan: An Independent Analysis

  • Wasim Shahid Malik

    (Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad)

  • Musleh-ud Din

    (Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad)

This paper analyses monetary policy transparency of the central bank (SBP) using the Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) index. The results show that the SBP scores 4.5 out of 15, which is lower than any of the central banks’ score in Eijffinger and Geraats (2006). The SBP is completely opaque on the procedural issues, whereas it is the least transparent in the policy transparency. On the political and the economic matters, the SBP is partially transparent. An area where the SBP is quite transparent, with moderate score, is operational transparency. In comparison with the other central banks, the SBP is at par with some of the central banks in political and operational transparency but ranks behind in all other respects.

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File URL: http://www.pide.org.pk/pdf/Working%20Paper/WorkingPaper-44.pdf
File Function: First Version, 2008
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Paper provided by Pakistan Institute of Development Economics in its series PIDE-Working Papers with number 2008:44.

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Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pid:wpaper:2008:44
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  7. Wasim Shahid Malik & Ather Maqsood Ahmed, 2007. "The Taylor Rule and the Macroeconomic Performance in Pakistan," PIDE-Working Papers 2007:34, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics.
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