Which kind of transparency? On the need for clarity in monetary policy-making
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More about this item
Keywords
communication; monetray policy strategy; transparency;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
- E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-MON-2000-08-26 (Monetary Economics)
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