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The value of publishing official central bank forecasts

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  • Tarkka, Juha
  • Mayes, David

Abstract

The aim of the present analysis is to shed light on the question whether Central Banks should publish their macroeconomic forecasts, and what could possibly be gained in monetary policy if they did so.We show that disclosing the Central Bank's assessment of the prevailing inflationary pressures in the form of a forecast improves macroeconomic performance even if this assessment is imprecise.This is because it makes policy more predictable.We are also interested in finding out the useful content of the forecasts, if published, and answering the question whether it makes a difference if these official forecasts are "unconditional" in the sense of incorporating the Central Bank's forecasts of its own policy as well, or "conditional" on some other policy assumption. Possible conditional alternatives may include assuming unchanged instruments, however specified, or assuming the kind of policy that the private sector is estimated to expect.The analysis comes out in favour of publishing unconditional forecasts, which reveal the intended results of monetary policy.A discussion of some practical issues related to publishing official macroeconomic forecasts is also provided. Key words: forecasting, transparency, monetary policy, central banks

Suggested Citation

  • Tarkka, Juha & Mayes, David, 1999. "The value of publishing official central bank forecasts," Research Discussion Papers 22/1999, Bank of Finland.
  • Handle: RePEc:bof:bofrdp:1999_022
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Mike Frith & Aaron Drew, 1998. "Forecasting at the Reserve Bank of New Zealand," Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, vol. 61, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Winkler, Bernhard, 2000. "Which kind of transparency? On the need for clarity in monetary policy-making," Working Paper Series 0026, European Central Bank.
    2. Ahrens, Steffen & Lustenhouwer, Joep & Tettamanzi, Michele, 2017. "The Stabilizing Role of Forward Guidance: A Macro Experiment," Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168063, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    3. Dewitt D Marston, 2001. "Financial System Standards and Financial Stability; The Case of the Basel Core Principles," IMF Working Papers 01/62, International Monetary Fund.
    4. Geraats, Petra M., 2001. "Why adopt transparency? The publication of central bank forecasts," Working Paper Series 41, European Central Bank.
    5. James, Jonathan G. & Lawler, Phillip, 2010. "Macroeconomic shocks, unionized labour markets and central bank disclosure policy: How beneficial is increased transparency?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 506-516, December.
    6. Seth B. Carpenter, 2004. "Transparency and monetary policy: what does the academic literature tell policymakers?," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2004-35, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US).
    7. Geraats, Petra M., 2000. "Why Adopt Transparency? The Publication of Central Bank Forecasts," Center for International and Development Economics Research, Working Paper Series qt0hw7h7cp, Center for International and Development Economics Research, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
    8. Arayssi, Mahmoud, 2015. "Transparent rules for deposing central bankers," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 1-17.
    9. Eijffinger, Sylvester C.W. & Geraats, Petra M., 2006. "How transparent are central banks?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 1-21, March.
    10. repec:bla:ecinqu:v:55:y:2017:i:3:p:1400-1415 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Brzoza-Brzezina, Michal & Kot, Adam, 2008. "The Relativity Theory Revisited: Is Publishing Interest Rate Forecasts Really so Valuable?," MPRA Paper 10296, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Siklos, Pierre L. & Abel, Istvan, 2002. "Is Hungary ready for inflation targeting?," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 309-333, December.
    13. Sweidan, Osama D. & Widner, Benjamin, 2008. "Transparency and central bank losses in developing countries," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 45-54, March.
    14. Winkler, Bernhard, 2000. "Which kind of transparency? On the need for clarity in monetary policy-making," Working Paper Series 26, European Central Bank.
    15. Sophocles N. Brissimis & Nicholas S. Magginas, 2017. "Monetary Policy Rules Under Heterogeneous Inflation Expectations," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(3), pages 1400-1415, July.
    16. Angela Huang & Dimitri Margaritis & David Mayes, 2001. "Monetary Policy Rules in Practice: Evidence from New Zealand," Multinational Finance Journal, Multinational Finance Journal, vol. 5(3), pages 175-200, September.
    17. James, Jonathan G. & Lawler, Phillip, 2007. "Supply shocks, private sector information and monetary policy: Is there inevitably a stabilization trade-off?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 77-83, July.
    18. Malcolm Edey, 2006. "An Australian perspective on inflation targeting, communication and transparency," BIS Papers chapters, in: Bank for International Settlements (ed.), Monetary policy in Asia: approaches and implementation, volume 31, pages 3-24, Bank for International Settlements.
    19. Toni Gravelle & Richhild Moessner, 2001. "Reactions of Canadian Interest Rates to Macroeconomic Announcements: Implications for Monetary Policy Transparency," Staff Working Papers 01-5, Bank of Canada.
    20. Osama Sweidan, 2010. "Central bank inability and Taylor rule in developing countries," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 57(4), pages 395-409, December.

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