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How transparent are central banks?

  • Eijffinger, Sylvester C.W.
  • Geraats, Petra M.

Central bank transparency has become the topic of a lively public and academic debate on monetary policy. Unfortunately, it has been complicated by the fact that transparency is a qualitative concept that is hard to measure. This Paper proposes a comprehensive index for central bank transparency that comprises the political, economic, procedural, policy and operational aspects of central banking. The index is compiled for nine major central banks. It is based on an analysis of information disclosure practices and reveals a rich variety in the degree of central bank transparency.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 22 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 1-21

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Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:22:y:2006:i:1:p:1-21
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544

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