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Monetary Policy Transparency in the Inflation Targeting

  • Mariusz Jarmuzek

    (CASE Center for Social & Economic Research)

  • Lucjan T. Orlowski

    (Sacred Heart University)

  • Artur Radziwill

    (CASE Center for Social & Economic Research)

This paper quantifies transparency of monetary policy in the three EU New Member States that have adopted direct inflation targeting strategy. Two measures of transparency are applied. The institutional measure reflects the extent to which a central bank discloses information that is related to the policymaking process. The behavioural measure reflects the clarity among the financial market participants about the true course of monetary policy. The paper shows an ambiguous association between the two measures of transparency, which may be attributed to the active exchange rate management policy that undermines the actual transparency proxied by the behavioural measure.

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File URL: http://econwpa.repec.org/eps/mac/papers/0502/0502025.pdf
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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Macroeconomics with number 0502025.

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Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: 12 Feb 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpma:0502025
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 32. This paper is part of research project supported by a grant from the CERGE-EI Foundation under a program of the Global Development Network
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://econwpa.repec.org

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  1. Jon Faust & Lars E. O. Svensson, 1998. "Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy with Unobservable Goals," NBER Working Papers 6452, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Svensson, L.E.O., 1998. "Open-Economy Inflation Targeting," Papers 638, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
  3. Glenn D. Rudebusch & Lars E. O. Svensson, 1998. "Policy rules for inflation targeting," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue Mar.
  4. Svensson, Lars E. O., 1999. "Inflation targeting as a monetary policy rule," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 607-654, June.
  5. Frederic S. Mishkin & Adam S. Posen, 1997. "Inflation targeting: lessons from four countries," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Aug, pages 9-110.
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  7. Cukierman, Alex, 2001. "Are Contemporary Central Banks Transparent about Economic Models and Objectives and What Difference Does it Make?," Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 2001,05, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre.
  8. Faust, Jon & Svensson, Lars E O, 2002. "The Equilibrium Degree of Transparency and Control in Monetary Policy," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 34(2), pages 520-39, May.
  9. Svensson, Lars E O, 1995. "Optimal Inflation Targets, 'Conservative' Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 1249, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  10. Roman Matoušek & Anita Taci, 2003. "Direct Inflation Targeting and Nominal Convergence: The Czech Case," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 269-283, July.
  11. Cosimano, Thomas F & Van Huyck, John B, 1993. "Central Bank Secrecy, Interest Rates, and Monetary Control," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 31(3), pages 370-82, July.
  12. Eijffinger, Sylvester C W & Geraats, Petra M, 2002. "How Transparent are Central Banks?," CEPR Discussion Papers 3188, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  13. Lucjan Orlowski, 2003. "Monetary Convergence and Risk Premiums in the EU Accession Countries," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 251-267, July.
  14. Hahn, Volker & Gersbach, Hans, 2001. "Should the Individual Voting Records of Central Bankers be Published?," Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 2001,02, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre.
  15. Cukierman, A., 2000. "Accountability, Credibility, Transparency and Stabilization Policy in the Eurosystem," Papers 2000-4, Tel Aviv.
  16. Orlowski, Lucjan T., 2001. "From inflation targeting to the euro-peg: A model of monetary convergence for transition economies," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 233-251, September.
  17. Dotsey, Michael, 1987. "Monetary policy, secrecy, and federal funds rate behavior," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 463-474, December.
  18. Hans Gersbach, 2003. "On the negative social value of central banks' knowledge transparency," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 91-102, 08.
  19. Petra M. Geraats, 2002. "Central Bank Transparency," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(483), pages 532-565, November.
  20. Alberto Alesina, 1988. "Macroeconomics and Politics," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1988, Volume 3, pages 13-62 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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