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Monetary Policy Transparency in Inflation Targeting Countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland

  • Mariusz Jarmuzek
  • Lucjan T. Orlowski
  • Artur Radziwill

This paper quantifies transparency of monetary policy in the three EU New Member States that have adopted direct inflation targeting strategy. Two measures of transparency are applied. The institutional measure reflects the extent to which a central bank discloses information that is related to the policymaking process. The behavioural measure reflects the clarity among the financial market participants about the true course of monetary policy. The paper shows an ambiguous association between the two measures of transparency, which may be attributed to the active exchange rate management policy that undermines the actual transparency proxied by the behavioural measure.

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File URL: http://www.case-research.eu/upload/publikacja_plik/2990223_SA%20281%202004%2006%2030%20ok.pdf
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Paper provided by CASE-Center for Social and Economic Research in its series CASE Network Studies and Analyses with number 0281.

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Length: 32 Pages
Date of creation: 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:sec:cnstan:0281
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  2. Faust, Jon & Svensson, Lars E O, 1998. "Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy with Unobservable Goals," CEPR Discussion Papers 1852, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Glenn D. Rudebusch & Lars E. O. Svensson, 1998. "Policy rules for inflation targeting," Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory 98-03, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
  4. Svensson, Lars E O, 1998. "Open-Economy Inflation Targeting," CEPR Discussion Papers 1989, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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  8. Svensson, Lars E. O., 1999. "Inflation targeting as a monetary policy rule," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 607-654, June.
  9. Jensen, Henrik, 2002. " Optimal Degrees of Transparency in Monetary Policymaking," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 104(3), pages 399-422, September.
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  11. Georgios Chortareas & David Stasavage & Gabriel Sterne, 2002. "Does it pay to be transparent? international evidence form central bank forecasts," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Jul, pages 99-118.
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  14. Orlowski, Lucjan T., 2001. "From inflation targeting to the euro-peg: A model of monetary convergence for transition economies," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 233-251, September.
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  17. Tabellini, Guido, 1987. "Secrecy of Monetary Policy and the Variability of Interest Rates," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 19(4), pages 425-36, November.
  18. Hans Gersbach, 2003. "On the negative social value of central banks' knowledge transparency," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 91-102, 08.
  19. Hahn, Volker & Gersbach, Hans, 2001. "Voting Transparency and Conflicting Interests in Central Bank Councils," Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 2001,03, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre.
  20. Alberto Alesina, 1988. "Macroeconomics and Politics," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1988, Volume 3, pages 13-62 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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