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Secrecy of Monetary Policy and the Variability of Interest Rates

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  • Guido Tabellini

    (UCLA)

Abstract

This paper addresses the issue of how secrecy of the short-run monetary policy objectives affects the behavior of the federal-funds rate. Secrecy is modeled by assuming that financial markets are unc ertain about a parameter in the Federal Reserve reaction function. Th ey learn over time about this parameter, by means of Bayes rule, and this learning process is reflected in the time path of interest rates and of reserve aggregates. The main result of the paper is that secr ecy tends to increase the volatility of the funds rate and of reserve aggregates. Copyright 1987 by Ohio State University Press.
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Suggested Citation

  • Guido Tabellini, 1986. "Secrecy of Monetary Policy and the Variability of Interest Rates," UCLA Economics Working Papers 426, UCLA Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:cla:uclawp:426
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    File URL: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/workingpapers/wp426.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Cyert, Richard M & DeGroot, Morris H, 1974. "Rational Expectations and Bayesian Analysis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(3), pages 521-536, May/June.
    2. Tabellini, Guido, 1988. "Learning and the volatility of exchange rates," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 243-250, June.
    3. Michael Dotsey, 1985. "Monetary policy, secrecy, and federal funds rate behavior," Working Paper 85-04, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
    4. V. Vance Roley & Carl E. Walsh, 1985. "Monetary Policy Regimes, Expected Inflation, and the Response of Interest Rates to Money Announcements," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 100(Supplemen), pages 1011-1039.
    5. Cukierman, Alex & Meltzer, Allan H, 1986. "A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1099-1128, September.
    6. Nichols, Donald A & Small, David H & Webster, Charles E, Jr, 1983. "Why Interest Rates Rise When an Unexpectedly Large Money Stock Is Announced," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(3), pages 383-388, June.
    7. Gary S. Anderson & Marvin Goodfriend & Anil K. Kashyap & George R. Moore & Richard D. Porter, 1984. "A weekly perfect foresight model of the nonborrowed reserve operating procedure," Working Paper 84-04, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
    8. Marvin Goodfriend, 1986. "A weekly rational expectations model of the nonborrowed reserve operating procedure," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, vol. 72(Jan), pages 11-28.
    9. McCallum, Bennett T., 1983. "On non-uniqueness in rational expectations models : An attempt at perspective," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 139-168.
    10. Shiller, Robert J, 1979. "The Volatility of Long-Term Interest Rates and Expectations Models of the Term Structure," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(6), pages 1190-1219, December.
    11. LeRoy, Stephen F & Porter, Richard D, 1981. "The Present-Value Relation: Tests Based on Implied Variance Bounds," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(3), pages 555-574, May.
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