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Central Bank forecasts and disclosure policy: Why it pays to be optimistic

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  • Eijffinger, Sylvester
  • Tesfaselassie, Mewael F.

Abstract

In a simple macromodel with forward-looking expectations, this Paper looks into disclosure policy when a central bank has private information on future shocks. The main result is that advance disclosure of forecasts of future shocks does not improve welfare, and in some cases is not desirable as it impairs stabilization of current inflation and/or output. This result holds when there is no credibility problem or the central bank’s preference is common knowledge. When there is uncertainty about the central bank’s preference shock, and this uncertainty is not resolved in the subsequent period, advance disclosure does not matter for current outcomes. The reason lies in the strong dependence of one-period-ahead private sector inflation forecasts on central bank actions, which induces the central bank to focus exclusively on price stability in subsequent periods. Another implication of the model is that, in contrast to forecasts of current period shocks emphasized by the literature, forecasts of future shocks may not be revealed to the public by current policy choices because the central bank refrains from responding to its own forecasts.
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(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

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  • Eijffinger, Sylvester & Tesfaselassie, Mewael F., 2007. "Central Bank forecasts and disclosure policy: Why it pays to be optimistic," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 30-50, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:23:y:2007:i:1:p:30-50
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    Cited by:

    1. James, Jonathan G. & Lawler, Phillip, 2010. "Macroeconomic shocks, unionized labour markets and central bank disclosure policy: How beneficial is increased transparency?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 506-516, December.
    2. Rhee, Hyuk Jae & Turdaliev, Nurlan, 2013. "Central bank transparency: Does it matter?," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 183-197.
    3. Meixing Dai & Eleftherios Spyromitros, 2010. "Accountability And Transparency About Central Bank Preferences For Model Robustness," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 57(2), pages 212-237, May.
    4. Tesfaselassie, Mewael F., 2007. "Shifts in the inflation target and communication of central bank forecasts," Kiel Working Papers 1319, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
    5. Meixing Dai, 2016. "Static And Dynamic Effects Of Central Bank Transparency," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(1), pages 55-78, January.
    6. Hyuk Rhee & Nurlan Turdaliev, 2015. "Central bank policy instrument forecasts," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 10(2), pages 221-245, October.
    7. van der Cruijsen, C.A.B., 2008. "The economic impact of central bank transparency," Other publications TiSEM 86c1ba91-1952-45b4-adac-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    8. Katerina Arnostova & Jozef Barunik & Jan Filacek & Michal Franta & David Havrlant & Roman Horvath & Filip Novotny & Marie Rakova & Lubos Ruzicka & Branislav Saxa & Katerina Smidkova & Peter Toth, 2012. "Macroeconomic Forecasting: Methods, Accuracy and Coordination," Occasional Publications - Edited Volumes, Czech National Bank, Research Department, edition 1, volume 10, number rb10/1 edited by Jan Babecky.
    9. Julian A. Parra-Polania, 2012. "Transparency: can central banks commit to truthful communication?," BORRADORES DE ECONOMIA 009614, BANCO DE LA REPÚBLICA.
    10. Jan Filáček & Branislav Saxa, 2012. "Central Bank Forecasts as a Coordination Device: Evidence from the Czech Republic," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 6(3), pages 244-264, October.
    11. repec:bla:intfin:v:20:y:2017:i:2:p:189-209 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Wojciech Charemza & Daniel Ladley, 2012. "MPC Voting, Forecasting and Inflation," Discussion Papers in Economics 12/23, Department of Economics, University of Leicester, revised Jan 2013.
    13. Meixing DAI & Eleftherios SPYROMITROS, 2007. "Walsh’s Contract and Transparency about Central Bank Preferences for Robust Control," Working Papers of BETA 2007-30, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    14. Rhee, Hyuk-jae & Turdaliev, Nurlan, 2010. "Aggregate shock and monetary policy regimes," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 201-217, March.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • E43 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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