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Monetary Policy Transparency in Pakistan : An Independent Analysis

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  • Wasim Shahid Malik

    (PIDE)

  • Musleh-ud Din

Abstract

This paper analyses monetary policy transparency of the central bank (SBP) using the Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) index. The results show that the SBP scores 4.5 out of 15, which is lower than any of the central banks score in Eijffinger and Geraats (2006). The SBP is completely opaque on the procedural issues, whereas it is the least transparent in the policy transparency. On the political and the economic matters, the SBP is partially transparent. An area where the SBP is quite transparent, with moderate score, is operational transparency. In comparison with the other central banks, the SBP is at par with some of the central banks in political and operational transparency but ranks behind in all other respects.

Suggested Citation

  • Wasim Shahid Malik & Musleh-ud Din, 2008. "Monetary Policy Transparency in Pakistan : An Independent Analysis," Macroeconomics Working Papers 22214, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:eab:macroe:22214
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Syed Kumail Abbas Rizvi & Bushra Naqvi & Sayyid Salman Rizavi, 2012. "What Does Pakistan Have to Join the Inflation Targeters’ Club—a Royal Flush or a Seven-Deuce Offsuit?," Lahore Journal of Economics, Department of Economics, The Lahore School of Economics, pages 35-62.
    2. Inayat Ullah Mangla, 2011. "Reconstructing the Performance of Pakistan’s Political Economy: Another Paradigm," Lahore Journal of Economics, Department of Economics, The Lahore School of Economics, pages 30-70.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Monetary Policy Transparency; State Bank of Pakistan; developing countries;

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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