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The Economics of Central Banking

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  • Cukierman, A.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

Abstract

Since 1989 twenty five countries in different parts of the world have substantially upgraded the legal independence of their central bank's. This trend is particularly remarkable in view of the fact that during the preceding forty years changes in central bank (CB) legislation were relatively rare. In parallel there has been a remarkable upsurge in both theoretical and empirical research on the meaning of central bank independence (CBI), its measurement, the interaction between government and the CB, the effect of CBI on the performance of the economy, the design of optimal contracts for central bankers, the functionning of nominal targets, and the deeper determinants of CBI. This paper is a broad survey of recent development in this rapidly growin area.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Cukierman, A., 1996. "The Economics of Central Banking," Other publications TiSEM e8f7a23c-1058-4c68-b6b5-d, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiutis:e8f7a23c-1058-4c68-b6b5-dcbe0499d1bd
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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