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Transparency in monetary policy

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  • Manfred Neumann

Abstract

The paper examines different aspects of transparency. Transparency serves democratic accountability by promoting public control. Specifically, the degree of transparency conditions inflation expectations, hence the central bank's scope for stabilization. Recent studies have put doubt on the notion that complete transparency is socially desirable. Here it is pointed out that the conclusion critically depends on an asymmetric modelling of stochastic preferences. The paper also reviews the pros and cons of revealing individual voting. A conclusion is that secrecy is to be prefered in monetary unions in order to shield governors from pressure by home governments. Copyright International Atlantic Economic Society 2002

Suggested Citation

  • Manfred Neumann, 2002. "Transparency in monetary policy," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 30(4), pages 353-365, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:atlecj:v:30:y:2002:i:4:p:353-365
    DOI: 10.1007/BF02298778
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/BF02298778
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    Cited by:

    1. Ullrich, Katrin, 2008. "Inflation expectations of experts and ECB communication," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 93-108, March.
    2. Katrin Ullrich, 2007. "Introducing Instruments of Central Bank Accountability in a Monetary Union," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 239-262, July.
    3. Ansgar Belke & Wim Kösters & Martin Leschke & Thorsten Polleit, 2005. "Back to the rules," Diskussionspapiere aus dem Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Hohenheim 268/2005, Department of Economics, University of Hohenheim, Germany.
    4. Otmar Issing, 2005. "Kommunikation, Transparenz, Rechenschaft - Geldpolitik im 21. Jahrhundert," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 6(4), pages 521-540, November.

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