Introducing Instruments of Central Bank Accountability in a Monetary Union
With an increasing number of independent central banks, accountability of central banks is also getting more attention. This paper analyses the possibility of introducing instruments of central bank accountability in a monetary union. In our model, monetary policy is influenced by the governments of the member states according to the degree of independence granted to the central bank. Instruments of democratic accountability are introduced which generate different expected losses for a government. The amount of the expected loss will determine the approval of a government to the implementation of a particular mechanism. We show that the agreement between the governments will only be unanimous for the definition of the inflation target of the central bank. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007
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