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Applying an Inflation Targeting Lens to Macroprudential Policy 'Institutions'

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Abstract

We describe the origins of inflation targeting in New Zealand, and then use the four key attributes of inflation targeting - independence, the inflation target, transparency, and accountability - as an organizing device to analyze macroprudential policy 'institutions' - the rules, regulations and governance frameworks that implement macroprudential policies.

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  • Güneş Kamber & Özer Karagedikli & Christie Smith, 2015. "Applying an Inflation Targeting Lens to Macroprudential Policy 'Institutions'," Reserve Bank of New Zealand Discussion Paper Series DP2015/04, Reserve Bank of New Zealand.
  • Handle: RePEc:nzb:nzbdps:2015/04
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    1. repec:nzb:nzbbul:dec2017:09 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. repec:nzb:nzbbul:aug2017:8 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Ioanna Kokores, 2015. "Lean-Against-the-Wind Monetary Policy: The Post-Crisis Shift in the Literature," SPOUDAI Journal of Economics and Business, SPOUDAI Journal of Economics and Business, University of Piraeus, vol. 65(3-4), pages 66-99, july-Dece.
    4. Alberto Naudon & Andrés Pérez, 2017. "An Overview of Inflation-Targeting Frameworks: Institutional Arrangements, Decision-making, & the Communication of Monetary Policy," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 811, Central Bank of Chile.
    5. repec:nzb:nzbbul:dec2017:11 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination

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