The Effects of Central Bank Independence and Inflation Targeting on Macroeconomic Performance: Evidence from Natural Experiments
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|Date of creation:||2013|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Economic Policy Research Institute, Social Science Centre, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada N6A 5C2|
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- Charles T Carlstrom & Timothy S Fuerst, 2009.
"Central Bank Independence And Inflation: A Note,"
Western Economic Association International, vol. 47(1), pages 182-186, 01.
- Alesina, Alberto & Summers, Lawrence H, 1993. "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(2), pages 151-62, May.
- Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
- Jeroen Klomp & Jakob de Haan, 2010. "Inflation And Central Bank Independence: A Meta-Regression Analysis," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(4), pages 593-621, 09.
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