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Central bank independence and inflation: a note

Author

Listed:
  • Charles T. Carlstrom
  • Timothy S. Fuerst

Abstract

We document increased central bank independence within the set of industrialized nations. This increased independence can account for nearly two thirds of the improved inflation performance of these nations over the last two decades.

Suggested Citation

  • Charles T. Carlstrom & Timothy S. Fuerst, 2006. "Central bank independence and inflation: a note," Working Paper 0621, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedcwp:0621
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August.
    2. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
    3. Alesina, Alberto & Summers, Lawrence H, 1993. "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(2), pages 151-162, May.
    4. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Masciandaro, Donato & Romelli, Davide, 2015. "Ups and downs of central bank independence from the Great Inflation to the Great Recession: theory, institutions and empirics," Financial History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 22(03), pages 259-289, December.
    2. Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2015. "Ups and Downs. Central Bank Independence from the Great Inflation to the Great Recession: Theory, Institutions and Empirics," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1503, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    3. Masciandaro, Donato & Volpicella, Alessio, 2016. "Macro prudential governance and central banks: Facts and drivers," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 101-119.
    4. Etienne Farvaque & Muhammad Azmat Hayat & Alexander Mihailov, 2017. "Who Supports the ECB? Evidence from Eurobarometer Survey Data," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(4), pages 654-677, April.
    5. Thomas F. Cargill & Gerald P. O'Driscoll Jr., 2013. "Federal Reserve Independence: Reality or Myth?," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 33(3), pages 417-435, Fall.
    6. repec:eee:riibaf:v:42:y:2017:i:c:p:855-864 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Carl E. Walshn, 2016. "Goals versus Rules as Central Bank Preformance Measures," Book Chapters, Hoover Institution, Stanford University.
    8. Dumiter, Florin Cornel, 2011. "Estimating the Impact of Central Bank Independence upon Macroeconomic Performance using a Panel Data Model," Journal for Economic Forecasting, Institute for Economic Forecasting, vol. 0(4), pages 106-128, December.
    9. Michael Parkin, 2014. "The Effects of Central Bank Independence and Inflation Targeting On Macroeconomic Performance: Evidence from Natural Experiments," Review of Economic Analysis, Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis, vol. 6(1), pages 1-35, June.
    10. repec:rnp:ecopol:ep1752 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Denise Côté & Carlos de Resende, 2008. "Globalization and Inflation: The Role of China," Staff Working Papers 08-35, Bank of Canada.
    12. Athina Zervoyianni & Athanasios Anastasiou & Andreas Anastasiou, 2014. "Does central bank independence really matter? Re-assessing the role of the independence of monetary policy-makers in macroeconomic outcomes," International Journal of Economics and Business Research, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 8(4), pages 427-473.
    13. Hayat, Muhammad Azmat & Farvaque, Etienne, 2012. "Public attitudes towards central bank independence: Lessons from the foundation of the ECB," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 512-523.
    14. repec:rdg:wpaper:em-dp2011-04 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Lucia Dalla Pellegrina & Donato Masciandaro & Rosaria Vega Pansini, 2011. "New Advantages of Tying One’s Hands: Banking Supervision, Monetary Policy and Central Bank Independence," Chapters,in: Handbook of Central Banking, Financial Regulation and Supervision, chapter 8 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    16. Michael Parkin, 2013. "Central Bank Laws and Monetary Policy Outcomes: A Three Decade Perspective," University of Western Ontario, Economic Policy Research Institute Working Papers 20131, University of Western Ontario, Economic Policy Research Institute.
    17. Etienne Farvaque & Muhammad Azmat Hayat & Alexander Mihailov, 2011. "Who Supports the ECB? Evidence from Eurobarometer Survey Data," Economics & Management Discussion Papers em-dp2011-04, Henley Business School, Reading University.
    18. Hielscher, Kai & Markwardt, Gunther, 2012. "The role of political institutions for the effectiveness of central bank independence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 286-301.
    19. Mark Mietzner & Dirk Schiereck, 2011. "Staatsfonds als Ankerinvestoren: Eine Note zum Einstieg von Aabar bei Daimler," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 12(1), pages 92-100, February.
    20. Papadamou, Stephanos & Sidiropoulos, Moïse & Spyromitros, Eleftherios, 2017. "Does central bank independence affect stock market volatility?," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 855-864.
    21. repec:jpe:journl:1461 is not listed on IDEAS
    22. Dalla Pellegrina, L. & Masciandaro, D. & Pansini, R.V., 2013. "The central banker as prudential supervisor: Does independence matter?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 415-427.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Banks and banking; Central ; Inflation (Finance);

    JEL classification:

    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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