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Central bank independence and inflation: a note

Author Info

Listed author(s):
  • Charles T. Carlstrom
  • Timothy S. Fuerst

Abstract

We document increased central bank independence within the set of industrialized nations. This increased independence can account for nearly two thirds of the improved inflation performance of these nations over the last two decades.

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Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland in its series Working Paper with number 0621.

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Date of creation: 2006
Handle: RePEc:fip:fedcwp:0621
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Keywords: Banks and banking; Central ; Inflation (Finance);

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
  • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
  • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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Cited by:

  1. Masciandaro, Donato & Romelli, Davide, 2015. "Ups and downs of central bank independence from the Great Inflation to the Great Recession: theory, institutions and empirics," Financial History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 22(03), pages 259-289, December.
  2. Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2015. "Ups and Downs. Central Bank Independence from the Great Inflation to the Great Recession: Theory, Institutions and Empirics," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1503, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
  3. Masciandaro, Donato & Volpicella, Alessio, 2016. "Macro prudential governance and central banks: Facts and drivers," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 101-119.
  4. Etienne Farvaque & Muhammad Azmat Hayat & Alexander Mihailov, 2011. "Who Supports the ECB? Evidence from Eurobarometer Survey Data," Economics & Management Discussion Papers em-dp2011-04, Henley Business School, Reading University.
  5. Thomas F. Cargill & Gerald P. O'Driscoll Jr., 2013. "Federal Reserve Independence: Reality or Myth?," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 33(3), pages 417-435, Fall.
  6. Carl E. Walshn, 2016. "Goals versus Rules as Central Bank Preformance Measures," Book Chapters, Hoover Institution, Stanford University.
  7. Dumiter, Florin Cornel, 2011. "Estimating the Impact of Central Bank Independence upon Macroeconomic Performance using a Panel Data Model," Journal for Economic Forecasting, Institute for Economic Forecasting, vol. 0(4), pages 106-128, December.
  8. Michael Parkin, 2014. "The Effects of Central Bank Independence and Inflation Targeting On Macroeconomic Performance: Evidence from Natural Experiments," Review of Economic Analysis, Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis, vol. 6(1), pages 1-35, June.
  9. Denise Côté & Carlos de Resende, 2008. "Globalization and Inflation: The Role of China," Staff Working Papers 08-35, Bank of Canada.
  10. Hayat, Muhammad Azmat & Farvaque, Etienne, 2012. "Public attitudes towards central bank independence: Lessons from the foundation of the ECB," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 512-523.
  11. repec:rdg:wpaper:em-dp2011-04 is not listed on IDEAS
  12. Lucia Dalla Pellegrina & Donato Masciandaro & Rosaria Vega Pansini, 2011. "New Advantages of Tying One’s Hands: Banking Supervision, Monetary Policy and Central Bank Independence," Chapters,in: Handbook of Central Banking, Financial Regulation and Supervision, chapter 8 Edward Elgar Publishing.
  13. Michael Parkin, 2013. "Central Bank Laws and Monetary Policy Outcomes: A Three Decade Perspective," University of Western Ontario, Economic Policy Research Institute Working Papers 20131, University of Western Ontario, Economic Policy Research Institute.
  14. Hielscher, Kai & Markwardt, Gunther, 2012. "The role of political institutions for the effectiveness of central bank independence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 286-301.
  15. Mark Mietzner & Dirk Schiereck, 2011. "Staatsfonds als Ankerinvestoren: Eine Note zum Einstieg von Aabar bei Daimler," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 12(1), pages 92-100, 02.
  16. Stephanos Papadamou & Moïse Sidiropoulos & Eleftherios Spyromitros, 2016. "Does Central Bank Independence Affect Stock Market Volatility?," Working Papers of BETA 2016-14, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
  17. Dalla Pellegrina, L. & Masciandaro, D. & Pansini, R.V., 2013. "The central banker as prudential supervisor: Does independence matter?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 415-427.

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