IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ijc/ijcjou/y2015q4a13.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Applying an Inflation-Targeting Lens to Macroprodential Policy "Institutions"

Author

Listed:
  • Günes Kamber

    (Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis)

  • Özer Karagedikli

    (Reserve Bank of New Zealand)

  • Christie Smith

    (Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis)

Abstract

We describe the origins of inflation targeting in New Zealand, and then use the four key attributes of inflation targeting—independence, the inflation target, transparency, and accountability—as an organizing device to analyze macroprudential policy “institutions”—the rules, regulations, and governance frameworks that implement macroprudential policies.

Suggested Citation

  • Günes Kamber & Özer Karagedikli & Christie Smith, 2015. "Applying an Inflation-Targeting Lens to Macroprodential Policy "Institutions"," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 11(4), pages 395-429, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:ijc:ijcjou:y:2015:q:4:a:13
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.ijcb.org/journal/ijcb15q4a13.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: http://www.ijcb.org/journal/ijcb15q4a13.htm
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Demertzis, Maria & Hughes Hallett, Andrew, 2007. "Central Bank transparency in theory and practice," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 760-789, December.
    2. Cukierman, Alex, 2008. "Central bank independence and monetary policymaking institutions -- Past, present and future," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 722-736, December.
    3. Richhild Moessner & William R. Nelson, 2008. "Central Bank Policy Rate Guidance and Financial Market Functioning," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 4(4), pages 193-226, December.
    4. Charles Bean, 1999. "Australasian Monetary Policy: A Comparative Perspective," Australian Economic Review, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, vol. 32(1), pages 64-73, March.
    5. Clive Briault & Andrew Haldane & Mervyn A. King, 1997. "Independence and Accountability," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Iwao Kuroda (ed.), Towards More Effective Monetary Policy, chapter 10, pages 299-340, Palgrave Macmillan.
    6. Christina D. Romer & David H. Romer, 1997. "Reducing Inflation: Motivation and Strategy," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number rome97-1.
    7. N. Gregory Mankiw & Ricardo Reis, 2003. "What Measure of Inflation Should a Central Bank Target?," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(5), pages 1058-1086, September.
    8. Michael Ehrmann & Sylvester Eijffinger & Marcel Fratzscher, 2012. "The Role of Central Bank Transparency for Guiding Private Sector Forecasts," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 114(3), pages 1018-1052, September.
    9. N. Nergiz Dincer & Barry Eichengreen, 2014. "Central Bank Transparency and Independence: Updates and New Measures," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 10(1), pages 189-259, March.
    10. Alan S. Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher & Jakob De Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2008. "Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 46(4), pages 910-945, December.
    11. Edward Nelson, 2007. "The Great Inflation and Early Disinflation in Japan and Germany," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 3(4), pages 23-76, December.
    12. Charles T. Carlstrom & Timothy S. Fuerst & Matthias Paustian, 2010. "Optimal Monetary Policy in a Model with Agency Costs," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(s1), pages 37-70, September.
    13. Helge Berger & Jakob De Haan & Sylvester C.W. Eijffinger, 2001. "Central Bank Independence: An Update of Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(1), pages 3-40, February.
    14. Lewis Evans & Arthur Grimes & Bryce Wilkinson, 1996. "Economic Reform in New Zealand 1984-95: The Pursuit of Efficiency," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(4), pages 1856-1902, December.
    15. Frank Smets, 2014. "Financial Stability and Monetary Policy: How Closely Interlinked?," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 10(2), pages 263-300, June.
    16. Eijffinger, Sylvester C.W. & Geraats, Petra M., 2006. "How transparent are central banks?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 1-21, March.
    17. Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, 2003. "Elected Versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and Evidence," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(5), pages 1176-1206, September.
    18. Alex Cukierman, 1992. "Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262031981, April.
    19. John B. Taylor, 2013. "Simple Rules for Financial Stability," Economics Working Papers 13106, Hoover Institution, Stanford University.
    20. Edward Nelson, 2005. "Monetary Policy Neglect and the Great Inflation in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 1(1), May.
    21. Glenn D. Rudebusch & John C. Williams, 2008. "Revealing the Secrets of the Temple: The Value of Publishing Central Bank Interest Rate Projections," NBER Chapters, in: Asset Prices and Monetary Policy, pages 247-289, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    22. Giuseppe Ferrero & Alessandro Secchi, 2009. "The Announcement of Monetary Policy Intentions," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 720, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    23. Lamorna Rogers, 2013. "A new approach to macro-prudential policy for New Zealand," Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, vol. 76, pages 12-22, September.
    24. Barth, James R. & Caprio, Gerard Jr. & Levine, Ross, 2012. "Guardians of Finance: Making Regulators Work for Us," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262017393.
    25. Agénor, Pierre-Richard & Pereira da Silva, Luiz A., 2014. "Macroprudential regulation and the monetary transmission mechanism," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 13(C), pages 44-63.
    26. Crowe, Christopher & Meade, Ellen E., 2008. "Central bank independence and transparency: Evolution and effectiveness," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 763-777, December.
    27. Michael Parkin, 2014. "The Effects of Central Bank Independence and Inflation Targeting On Macroeconomic Performance: Evidence from Natural Experiments," Review of Economic Analysis, Digital Initiatives at the University of Waterloo Library, vol. 6(1), pages 1-35, June.
    28. Petra M. Geraats, 2007. "The Mystique of Central Bank Speak," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 3(1), pages 37-80, March.
    29. Alesina, Alberto & Summers, Lawrence H, 1993. "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(2), pages 151-162, May.
    30. Bianca De Paoli & Matthias Paustian, 2013. "Coordinating monetary and macroprudential policies," Staff Reports 653, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    31. Christina D. Romer & David H. Romer, 1997. "Institutions for Monetary Stability," NBER Chapters, in: Reducing Inflation: Motivation and Strategy, pages 307-334, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    32. Marvin Goodfriend, 2012. "The Elusive Promise of Independent Central Banking," Monetary and Economic Studies, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan, vol. 30, pages 39-54, November.
    33. Eijffinger, S. & De Hann, J., 1995. "The Political Economy of Central Bank Independence," Papers 9587, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
    34. Carl E. Walsh, 2007. "Optimal Economic Transparency," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 3(1), pages 5-36, March.
    35. Benjamin Born & Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher, 2014. "Central Bank Communication on Financial Stability," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 124(577), pages 701-734, June.
    36. Alan S. Blinder, 2010. "How Central Should the Central Bank Be?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 48(1), pages 123-133, March.
    37. Jeroen Klomp & Jakob De Haan, 2010. "Inflation And Central Bank Independence: A Meta‐Regression Analysis," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(4), pages 593-621, September.
    38. Ricardo Reis, 2013. "Central Bank Design," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 27(4), pages 17-44, Fall.
    39. Willem H. Buiter & Marcus Miller, 1983. "Changing the Rules: Economic Consequences of the Thatcher Regime," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 14(2), pages 305-380.
    40. David Currie & Paul Levine, 1985. "Macroeconomic Policy Design in an Interdependent World," NBER Chapters, in: International Economic Policy Coordination, pages 228-273, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    41. Lars E. O. Svensson, 2006. "Social Value of Public Information: Comment: Morris and Shin (2002) Is Actually Pro-Transparency, Not Con," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 448-452, March.
    42. Cukierman, Alex & Webb, Steven B & Neyapti, Bilin, 1992. "Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 6(3), pages 353-398, September.
    43. Alan S. Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher & Jakob De Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2008. "Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 46(4), pages 910-945, December.
    44. Arnone, Marco & Romelli, Davide, 2013. "Dynamic central bank independence indices and inflation rate: A new empirical exploration," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 385-398.
    45. Stanley Fischer, 2014. "Macroprudential Policy in Action: Israel," MIT Press Book Chapters, in: What Have We Learned? Macroeconomic Policy After the Crisis, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 7, pages 87-98, The MIT Press.
    46. Ben S. Bernanke & Frederic S. Mishkin, 1997. "Inflation Targeting: A New Framework for Monetary Policy?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(2), pages 97-116, Spring.
    47. Mr. Martin Cihak & Ms. Sharika Teh Sharifuddin & Mr. Kalin I Tintchev & Mr. Samir Jahjah & Ms. Sònia Muñoz, 2012. "Financial Stability Reports: What Are they Good for?," IMF Working Papers 2012/001, International Monetary Fund.
    48. Pierre Siklos, 2011. "Central bank transparency: another look," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 18(10), pages 929-933.
    49. Ashley Dunstan, 2014. "The interaction between monetary and macro-prudential policy," Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, vol. 77, pages 15-25, June.
    50. Cheng Hoon Lim & Mr. Akira Otani & Mr. Xiaoyong Wu & Mr. Ivo Krznar & Mr. Fabian Lipinsky, 2013. "The Macroprudential Framework: Policy Responsiveness and Institutional Arrangements," IMF Working Papers 2013/166, International Monetary Fund.
    51. Petra M. Geraats, 2002. "Central Bank Transparency," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(483), pages 532-565, November.
    52. repec:pri:cepsud:161blinder is not listed on IDEAS
    53. Aoki, Kosuke, 2001. "Optimal monetary policy responses to relative-price changes," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 55-80, August.
    54. Campbell, John Y. (ed.), 2008. "Asset Prices and Monetary Policy," National Bureau of Economic Research Books, University of Chicago Press, number 9780226092119, October.
    55. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2002. "Social Value of Public Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1521-1534, December.
    56. Alan S. Blinder, 2010. "How Central Should the Central Bank Be?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 48(1), pages 123-133, March.
    57. Erlend Nier & Heedon Kang, 2016. "Monetary and macroprudential policies – exploring interactions," BIS Papers chapters, in: Bank for International Settlements (ed.), Macroprudential policy, volume 86, pages 27-38, Bank for International Settlements.
    58. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1993. "Designing institutions for monetary stability," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 53-84, December.
    59. N. Nergiz Dincer & Barry Eichengreen, 2007. "Central Bank Transparency: Where, Why, and with What Effects?," NBER Working Papers 13003, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    60. Walsh, Carl E, 1995. "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 150-167, March.
    61. Berger, Wolfram & Kißmer, Friedrich, 2013. "Central bank independence and financial stability: A tale of perfect harmony?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 109-118.
    62. repec:pri:cepsud:198blinder is not listed on IDEAS
    63. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Amber Wadsworth, 2017. "An international comparison of inflation-targeting frameworks," Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, vol. 80, pages 1-34, August.
    2. Ioanna Kokores, 2015. "Lean-Against-the-Wind Monetary Policy: The Post-Crisis Shift in the Literature," SPOUDAI Journal of Economics and Business, SPOUDAI Journal of Economics and Business, University of Piraeus, vol. 65(3-4), pages 66-99, july-Dece.
    3. Amber Wadsworth, 0. "An international comparison of inflation-targeting frameworks," Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, vol. 80.
    4. Alberto Naudon & Andrés Pérez, 2017. "An Overview of Inflation-Targeting Frameworks: Institutional Arrangements, Decision-making, & the Communication of Monetary Policy," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 811, Central Bank of Chile.
    5. International Monetary Fund, 2016. "Sweden: Selected Issues," IMF Staff Country Reports 2016/354, International Monetary Fund.
    6. Chris Hunt, 2017. "Independence with accountability: financial system regulation and the Reserve Bank," Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, vol. 80, December.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2019. "Behavioral Monetary Policymaking: Economics, Political Economy and Psychology," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Behavioral Finance The Coming of Age, chapter 9, pages 285-329, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    2. D. Masciandaro, 2019. "What Bird Is That? Central Banking And Monetary Policy In The Last Forty Years," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 19127, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    3. Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2018. "To Be or not to Be a Euro Country? The Behavioural Political Economics of Currency Unions," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1883, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    4. Masciandaro, Donato & Romelli, Davide, 2015. "Ups and downs of central bank independence from the Great Inflation to the Great Recession: theory, institutions and empirics," Financial History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 22(3), pages 259-289, December.
    5. Papadamou, Stephanos & Sidiropoulos, Moïse & Spyromitros, Eleftherios, 2017. "Does central bank independence affect stock market volatility?," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 855-864.
    6. Kwabi, Frank O. & Boateng, Agyenim & Du, Min, 2020. "Impact of central bank independence and transparency on international equity portfolio allocation: A cross-country analysis," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    7. Athina Zervoyianni & Athanasios Anastasiou & Andreas Anastasiou, 2014. "Does central bank independence really matter? Re-assessing the role of the independence of monetary policy-makers in macroeconomic outcomes," International Journal of Economics and Business Research, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 8(4), pages 427-473.
    8. van der Cruijsen, C.A.B., 2008. "The economic impact of central bank transparency," Other publications TiSEM 86c1ba91-1952-45b4-adac-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    9. Crowe, Christopher & Meade, Ellen E., 2008. "Central bank independence and transparency: Evolution and effectiveness," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 763-777, December.
    10. Masciandaro, Donato, 2022. "Independence, conservatism, and beyond: Monetary policy, central bank governance and central banker preferences (1981–2021)," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
    11. Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2018. "Beyond the Central Bank Independence Veil: New Evidence," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1871, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    12. Ma, Yong & Li, Shushu, 2015. "Bayesian estimation of China's monetary policy transparency: A New Keynesian approach," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 236-248.
    13. Davide Romelli, 2018. "The political economy of reforms in central bank design: evidence from a new dataset," Trinity Economics Papers tep0918, Trinity College Dublin, Department of Economics.
    14. Zafar Hayat, 2017. "Pakistan’s Monetary Policy: Some Fundamental Issues," The Pakistan Development Review, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, vol. 56(1), pages 31-58.
    15. Hwang, In Do & Lustenberger, Thomas & Rossi, Enzo, 2021. "Does communication influence executives’ opinion of central bank policy?☆," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 115(C).
    16. Hughes Hallett, Andrew & Libich, Jan, 2006. "Central Bank Independence, Accountability and Transparency: Complements or Strategic Substitutes?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5470, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    17. Petra M. Geraats, 2009. "Trends in Monetary Policy Transparency," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(2), pages 235-268, August.
    18. Bernd Hayo & Ummad Mazhar, 2014. "Monetary Policy Committee Transparency: Measurement, Determinants, and Economic Effects," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 25(4), pages 739-770, September.
    19. Ricardo Reis, 2013. "Central Bank Design," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 27(4), pages 17-44, Fall.
    20. Eichler, Stefan & Littke, Helge C.N. & Tonzer, Lena, 2017. "Central bank transparency and cross-border banking," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 1-30.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ijc:ijcjou:y:2015:q:4:a:13. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: . General contact details of provider: https://www.ijcb.org/ .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Bank for International Settlements (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.ijcb.org/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.