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Central Bank Design

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  • Reis, Ricardo

Abstract

What set of institutions can support the activity of a central bank? Designing a central bank requires specifying its objective function, including the bank's mandate at different horizons and the choice of banker(s), specifying the resource constraint that limits the resources that the central bank generates, the assets it holds, or the payments on its liabilities, and finally specifying how the central bank will communicate with private agents to affect the way they respond to policy choices. This paper summarizes the relevant economic literature that bears on these choices, leading to twelve principles on central bank design.

Suggested Citation

  • Reis, Ricardo, 2013. "Central Bank Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 9567, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9567
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    28. Alan S. Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher & Jakob De Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2008. "Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 46(4), pages 910-945, December.
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    31. Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher, 2007. "Communication by Central Bank Committee Members: Different Strategies, Same Effectiveness?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 39(2‐3), pages 509-541, March.
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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