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Public Communication and Information Acquisition

  • Ryan Chahrour

    ()

    (Boston College)

This paper models the tradeoff, perceived by central banks and other public actors, between providing the public with useful information and the risk of overwhelming it with excessive communication. An information authority chooses how many signals to provide regarding an aggregate state and agents respond by choosing how many signals to observe. When agents desire coordination, the number of signals they acquire may decrease in the number released. The optimal quantity of communication is positive, but does not maximize agents' acquisition of information. In contrast to a model without information choice, the authority always prefers to provide more precise signals.

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Paper provided by Boston College Department of Economics in its series Boston College Working Papers in Economics with number 803.

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Date of creation: 24 Jul 2012
Date of revision:
Publication status: published, American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 6:3, 73-101, 2014
Handle: RePEc:boc:bocoec:803
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  1. Judd, Kenneth L., 1985. "The law of large numbers with a continuum of IID random variables," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 19-25, February.
  2. Clemens Kool & Menno Middeldorp & Stephanie Rosenkranz, 2011. "Central Bank Transparency and the Crowding Out of Private Information in Financial Markets," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 43(4), pages 765-774, 06.
  3. Manuel Amador & Pierre Olivier Weill, 2008. "Learning from Prices: Public Communication and Welfare," 2008 Meeting Papers 390, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  4. David P. Myatt & Chris Wallace, 2012. "Endogenous Information Acquisition in Coordination Games," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 79(1), pages 340-374.
  5. Jacob Wong, 2008. "Information acquisition, dissemination, and transparency of monetary policy," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 41(1), pages 46-79, February.
  6. Harald Uhlig, 2010. "A Law of Large Numbers for Large Economies," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2070, David K. Levine.
  7. Mauro Roca, 2010. "Transparency and Monetary Policy with Imperfect Common Knowledge," IMF Working Papers 10/91, International Monetary Fund.
  8. Venky Venkateswaran & Luis Llosa, 2012. "Efficiency With Endogenous Information Choice," 2012 Meeting Papers 660, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  9. McCall, John J., 1991. "Exchangeability and its economic applications," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 549-568, July.
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