IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Endogenous Information Acquisition in Coordination Games

  • David P. Myatt
  • Chris Wallace

In the context of a "beauty contest" coordination game (in which pay-offs depend on the proximity of actions to an unobserved state variable and to the average action) players choose how much costly attention to pay to various informative signals; they endogenously select information sources and how carefully to listen to them.� Each signal has an underlying accuracy (how precisely it identifies the state variable) and a clarity (how easy it is for players to understand what the signal says).� The unique information-acquisition equilibrium has interesting properties: only a subset of signals are assigned positive weight and attention; these are the clearest signals available, even if such signals have poor underlying accuracy; the size of the subset shrinks as the complementarity of players' actions becomes more acute; and, if actions are more complementary, the information endogenously acquired in equilibrium is more public in nature.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 445.

in new window

Date of creation: 01 Aug 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:445
Contact details of provider: Postal: Manor Rd. Building, Oxford, OX1 3UQ
Web page:

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2002. "Social Value of Public Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1521-1534, December.
  2. David P. Myatt & Torun Dewan, 2007. "The Qualities of Leadership: Direction, Communication, and Obfuscation," Economics Series Working Papers 311, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  3. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2005. "Central Bank Transparency and the Signal Value of Prices," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 36(2), pages 1-66.
  4. George-Marios Angeletos & Alessandro Pavan, 2007. "Efficient Use of Information and Social Value of Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(4), pages 1103-1142, 07.
  5. Geore-Marios Angeletos & Alessandro Pavan, 2004. "Transparency of Information and Coordination in Economies with Investment Complementarities," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000289, UCLA Department of Economics.
  6. Laura Veldkamp & Christian Hellwig, 2006. "Knowing What Others Know: Coordination Motives in Information Acquisition," Working Papers 06-14, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  7. Jeffery D. Amato & Hyun Song Shin & Stephen Morris, 2003. "Communication and monetary policy," BIS Working Papers 123, Bank for International Settlements.
  8. Christian Hellwig, 2004. "Heterogeneous Information and the Benefits of Public Information Disclosures (October 2005)," UCLA Economics Online Papers 283, UCLA Department of Economics.
  9. Lucas, Robert E, Jr, 1973. "Some International Evidence on Output-Inflation Tradeoffs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(3), pages 326-34, June.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:445. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Monica Birds)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.