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Optimal Degree of Public Information Dissemination

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  • Cornand, Camille
  • Heinemann, Frank

Abstract

Financial markets and macroeconomic environments are often characterized by positive externalities. In these environments, transparency may reduce expected welfare from an ex-ante point of view: public announcements serve as a focal point for higher-order beliefs and affect agents’ behaviour more than justified by their informational contents. Some scholars conclude that it might be better to reduce the precision of public signals or entirely withhold information. This paper shows that public information should always be provided with maximum precision, but under certain conditions not to all agents. Restricting the degree of publicity is a better-suited instrument for preventing the negative welfare effects of public announcements than restrictions on their precision are.

Suggested Citation

  • Cornand, Camille & Heinemann, Frank, 2006. "Optimal Degree of Public Information Dissemination," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 158, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    • Handle: RePEc:trf:wpaper:158
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Transparency; public information; private information; coordination; strategic complementarity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • F31 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Exchange

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