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Communication and Monetary Policy

  • Stephen Morris

    ()

    (Yale University, Cowles Foundation)

  • Jeffery D. Amato

    ()

    (Bank for International Settlements (BIS))

  • Hyun Song Shin

    ()

    (University of London, London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE), Department of Accounting and Finance)

One role of monetary policy is to coordinate expectations in the economy and greater transparency of monetary policy may lead to greater coordination. But if transparent monetary policy helps coordinate expectations, then it must also magnify mistakes.

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Paper provided by Yale School of Management in its series Yale School of Management Working Papers with number ysm345.

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Date of creation: 28 Jul 2004
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Handle: RePEc:ysm:somwrk:ysm345
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://icf.som.yale.edu/

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  1. Winkler, Bernhard, 2000. "Which kind of transparency? On the need for clarity in monetary policy-making," Working Paper Series 0026, European Central Bank.
  2. Lucas, Robert Jr., 1972. "Expectations and the neutrality of money," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 103-124, April.
  3. Howitt, P. & Mcfee, R.P., 1990. "Animal Spirits," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 9005, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
  4. Lucas, Robert E, Jr, 1973. "Some International Evidence on Output-Inflation Tradeoffs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(3), pages 326-34, June.
  5. Jensen, Henrik, 2001. "Optimal degrees of transparency in monetary policymaking," Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 2001,04, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre.
  6. Banerjee, Abhijit V, 1992. "A Simple Model of Herd Behavior," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 107(3), pages 797-817, August.
  7. Woodford, Michael, 1999. "Optimal monetary policy inertia," CFS Working Paper Series 1999/09, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
  8. Azariadis, Costas, 1981. "Self-fulfilling prophecies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 380-396, December.
  9. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2002. "Social Value of Public Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1521-1534, December.
  10. Carol Corrado, 1986. "Reducing uncertainty in current analysis and projections: the estimation of monthly GNP," Special Studies Papers 209, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  11. Woodford, Michael, 1986. "Learning to Believe in Sunspots," Working Papers 86-16, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  12. Petra M. Geraats, 2002. "Central Bank Transparency," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(483), pages 532-565, November.
  13. Michael Woodford, 2001. "Imperfect Common Knowledge and the Effects of Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 8673, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. Alan S. Blinder, 1999. "Central Banking in Theory and Practice," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262522608, June.
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