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Communication, transparency, accountability: monetary policy in the twenty-first century

  • Otmar Issing
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    This article is a revised English translation of the Thunen Lecture, given at the Annual Congress of the Verein fur Socialpolitik, September 29, 2004, in Dresden, Germany.

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    File URL: http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/05/03/part1/Issing.pdf
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    Article provided by Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis in its journal Review.

    Volume (Year): (2005)
    Issue (Month): Mar ()
    Pages: 65-83

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    Handle: RePEc:fip:fedlrv:y:2005:i:mar:p:65-83:n:v.87no.2,pt.1
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    1. Faust, Jon & Svensson, Lars E O, 2001. "Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy with Unobservable Goals," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 42(2), pages 369-97, May.
    2. Adam, Klaus, 2003. "Optimal monetary policy with imperfect common knowledge," Working Paper Series 0223, European Central Bank.
    3. Willem H. Buiter, 1999. "Alice in Euroland," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(2), pages 181-209, 06.
    4. Frederic S. Mishkin, 2004. "Why the Federal Reserve Should Adopt Inflation Targeting," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(1), pages 117-127, 03.
    5. Eijffinger, Sylvester C. W. & Hoeberichts, Marco, 2000. "Central Bank accountability and transparency: theory and some evidence," Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 2000,06, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre.
    6. Kerstin Bernoth & Jürgen von Hagen, 2004. "The Euribor Futures Market: Efficiency and the Impact of ECB Policy Announcements," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(1), pages 1-24, 03.
    7. Vítor Gaspar & Gabriel Perez-Quiros & Jorge Sicilia, 2001. "The ECB monetary policy strategy and the money market," Working Papers 47, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank).
    8. Goodfriend, Marvin, 1986. "Monetary mystique: Secrecy and central banking," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 63-92, January.
    9. Alan S. Blinder, 1999. "Central Banking in Theory and Practice," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262522608, June.
    10. Benjamin M. Friedman, 2004. "Why the Federal Reserve Should Not Adopt Inflation Targeting," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(1), pages 129-136, 03.
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