Kommunikation, Transparenz, Rechenschaft - Geldpolitik im 21. Jahrhundert
Communication with different audiences is a special challenge for central banks. Communication has to be considered in the context of the principles of transparency and accountability. Their interdependence stems from the mandate of the central bank and its position in society. The communication policy of the European Central Bank reflects the particular challenges of a new institution in a complex monetary arrangement. Copyright Verein für Socialpolitik und Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2005
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 6 (2005)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=1465-6493|
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=1465-6493|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Marvin Goodfriend, 1985.
"Monetary mystique : secrecy and central banking,"
85-07, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
- W.H. Buiter, 1999.
"Alice in Euroland,"
CEP Discussion Papers
dp0423, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Eijffinger, Sylvester C. W. & Hoeberichts, Marco, 2000.
"Central Bank accountability and transparency: theory and some evidence,"
Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies
2000,06, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre.
- Eijffinger, Sylvester C W & Hoeberichts, Marco, 2002. "Central Bank Accountability and Transparency: Theory and Some Evidence," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(1), pages 73-96, Spring.
- Kerstin Bernoth & Jürgen von Hagen, 2004. "The Euribor Futures Market: Efficiency and the Impact of ECB Policy Announcements," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(1), pages 1-24, 03.
- Faust, Jon & Svensson, Lars E O, 1998.
"Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy with Unobservable Goals,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
1852, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Faust, Jon & Svensson, Lars E O, 2001. "Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy with Unobservable Goals," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 42(2), pages 369-97, May.
- Svensson, Lars E.O. & Faust, John, 1998. "Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy with Unobservable Goals," Seminar Papers 636, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
- Jon Faust & Lars E.O. Svensson, 1998. "Transparency and credibility: monetary policy with unobservable goals," International Finance Discussion Papers 605, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Faust, J. & Svensson, L.E.O., 1998. "Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy with Unobservable Goals," Papers 636, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
- Jon Faust & Lars E. O. Svensson, 1998. "Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy with Unobservable Goals," NBER Working Papers 6452, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Klaus Adam, 2003.
"Optimal Monetary Policy with Imperfect Common Knowledge,"
Computing in Economics and Finance 2003
263, Society for Computational Economics.
- Adam, Klaus, 2007. "Optimal monetary policy with imperfect common knowledge," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 267-301, March.
- Adam, Klaus, 2003. "Optimal Monetary Policy with Imperfect Common Knowledge," CFS Working Paper Series 2003/12, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
- Adam, Klaus, 2004. "Optimal Monetary Policy with Imperfect Common Knowledge," CEPR Discussion Papers 4594, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Klaus Adam, 2004. "Optimal Monetary Policy with Imperfect Common Knowledge," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 24, Econometric Society.
- Adam, Klaus, 2003. "Optimal monetary policy with imperfect common knowledge," Working Paper Series 0223, European Central Bank.
- Klaus Adam, 2004. "Optimal Monetary Policy with Imperfect Common Knowledge," DNB Staff Reports (discontinued) 116, Netherlands Central Bank.
- Winkler, Bernhard, 2000. "Which kind of transparency? On the need for clarity in monetary policy-making," Working Paper Series 0026, European Central Bank.
- Sims, Christopher A., 2003. "Implications of rational inattention," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 665-690, April.
- Daniel Kahneman, 2003. "Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(5), pages 1449-1475, December.
- Hirshleifer, Jack, 1971. "The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(4), pages 561-74, September.
- Manfred Neumann, 2002. "Transparency in monetary policy," Atlantic Economic Journal, International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 30(4), pages 353-365, December.
- Jakob de Haan & Sylvester C.W. Eijffinger, 2000. "The Democratic Accountability of the European Central Bank: A Comment on Two Fairy-tales," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(3), pages 393-407, 09.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:perwir:v:6:y:2005:i:4:p:521-540. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.