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Real Rigidity, Nominal Rigidity, and the Social Value of Information

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  • George-Marios Angeletos
  • Luigi Iovino
  • Jennifer La'o

Abstract

Does welfare improve when ?firms are better informed about the state of the economy and can better coordinate their decisions? We address this question in an elementary business-cycle model that highlights how the dispersion of information can be the source of both nominal and real rigidity. Within this context we develop a taxonomy for how the social value of information depends on the two rigidities, on the sources of the business cycle, and on the conduct of monetary policy. JEL codes: C7, D6, D8. Keywords: Fluctuations, informational frictions, strategic complementarity, coordination, beauty contests, central-bank transparency.

Suggested Citation

  • George-Marios Angeletos & Luigi Iovino & Jennifer La'o, 2015. "Real Rigidity, Nominal Rigidity, and the Social Value of Information," Working Papers 543, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  • Handle: RePEc:igi:igierp:543
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2013. "Robust Predictions in Games With Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(4), pages 1251-1308, July.
    2. Manuel Amador & Pierre-Olivier Weill, 2010. "Learning from Prices: Public Communication and Welfare," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 118(5), pages 866-907.
    3. N. Gregory Mankiw & Ricardo Reis, 2002. "Sticky Information versus Sticky Prices: A Proposal to Replace the New Keynesian Phillips Curve," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 117(4), pages 1295-1328.
    4. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2013. "Robust Predictions in Games With Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(4), pages 1251-1308, July.
    5. Bartosz Mackowiak & Mirko Wiederholt, 2009. "Optimal Sticky Prices under Rational Inattention," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(3), pages 769-803, June.
    6. Guido Lorenzoni, 2010. "Optimal Monetary Policy with Uncertain Fundamentals and Dispersed Information ," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 77(1), pages 305-338.
    7. Mauro F Roca, 2010. "Transparency and Monetary Policy with Imperfect Common Knowledge," IMF Working Papers 10/91, International Monetary Fund.
    8. Baeriswyl, Romain & Cornand, Camille, 2010. "The signaling role of policy actions," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(6), pages 682-695, September.
    9. Jordi Galí, 2008. "Introduction to Monetary Policy, Inflation, and the Business Cycle: An Introduction to the New Keynesian Framework," Introductory Chapters,in: Monetary Policy, Inflation, and the Business Cycle: An Introduction to the New Keynesian Framework Princeton University Press.
    10. Sims, Christopher A., 2003. "Implications of rational inattention," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 665-690, April.
    11. repec:cwl:cwldpp:1821rrr is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Romain Baeriswyl & Camille Cornand, 2010. "The signaling role of policy actions," Post-Print halshs-01704165, HAL.
    13. Carl E. Walsh, 2007. "Optimal Economic Transparency," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 3(1), pages 5-36, March.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Fujiwara, Ippei & Waki, Yuichiro, 2015. "Private news and monetary policy forward guidance or (the expected virtue of ignorance)," Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute Working Paper 238, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
    2. Camille Cornand & Frank Heinemann, 2018. "Monetary Policy obeying the Taylor Principle Turns Prices into Strategic Substitutes," Working Papers 1805, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    3. Romain Baeriswyl & Camille Cornand & Bruno Ziliotto, 2016. "Observing and shaping the market: the dilemma of central banks," Working Papers 1623, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    4. Thomas Lustenberger & Enzo Rossi, 2017. "The Social Value of Information: A Test of a Beauty and Non-Beauty Contest," Working Papers 2017-17, Swiss National Bank.
    5. Coenen, Günter & Ehrmann, Michael & Gaballo, Gaetano & Hoffmann, Peter & Nakov, Anton & Nardelli, Stefano & Persson, Eric & Strasser, Georg, 2017. "Communication of monetary policy in unconventional times," Working Paper Series 2080, European Central Bank.
    6. repec:eee:macchp:v2-1065 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. P. Andrade & G. Gaballo & E. Mengus & B. Mojon, 2015. "Forward Guidance and Heterogeneous Beliefs," Working papers 573, Banque de France.
    8. Jakob Grazzini & Domenico Massaro, 2016. "Dispersed Information and the Origins of Aggregate Fluctuations," CESifo Working Paper Series 5957, CESifo Group Munich.
    9. Camille Cornand & Frank Heinemann, 2018. "Monetary Policy obeying the Taylor Principle Turns Prices into Strategic Substitutes," Working Papers halshs-01759692, HAL.
    10. George-Marios Angeletos & Chen Lian, 2016. "Forward Guidance without Common Knowledge," NBER Working Papers 22785, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy

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