IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/red/sed017/89.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Forward Guidance without Common Knowledge

Author

Listed:
  • George-Marios Angeletos

    (MIT)

  • Chen Lian

    (MIT)

Abstract

Forward guidance—and macroeconomic policy more generally—relies on shifting expectations, not only of future policy, but also of future economic outcomes such as income and inflation. These expectations matter through general-equilibrium mechanisms. Recasting these expectations and these mechanisms in terms of higher-order beliefs reveals how standard policy predictions hinge on the assumption of common knowledge. Relaxing this assumption anchors expectations and attenuates the associated general-equilibrium effects. In the context of interest, this helps lessen the forward-guidance puzzle, as well as the paradox of flexibility. More broadly, it helps operationalize the idea that policy makers may find it hard to shift expectations of economic outcomes even if they can easily shift expectations of policy.

Suggested Citation

  • George-Marios Angeletos & Chen Lian, 2017. "Forward Guidance without Common Knowledge," 2017 Meeting Papers 89, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  • Handle: RePEc:red:sed017:89
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://economicdynamics.org/meetpapers/2017/paper_89.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Chahrour, Ryan & Gaballo, Gaetano, 2017. "Learning from prices: amplication and business fluctuations," Working Paper Series 2053, European Central Bank.
    2. Nimark, Kristoffer, 2008. "Dynamic pricing and imperfect common knowledge," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 365-382, March.
    3. Morris, Stephen & Shin, Hyun Song, 1998. "Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 587-597, June.
    4. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2013. "Robust Predictions in Games With Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(4), pages 1251-1308, July.
    5. Manuel Amador & Pierre-Olivier Weill, 2010. "Learning from Prices: Public Communication and Welfare," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 118(5), pages 866-907.
    6. Olivier Coibion & Yuriy Gorodnichenko, 2012. "What Can Survey Forecasts Tell Us about Information Rigidities?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 120(1), pages 116-159.
    7. Xavier Gabaix, 2014. "A Sparsity-Based Model of Bounded Rationality," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 129(4), pages 1661-1710.
    8. Michael Kiley, 2016. "Policy Paradoxes in the New-Keynesian Model," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 21, pages 1-15, July.
    9. Ryan Chahrour, 2014. "Public Communication and Information Acquisition," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(3), pages 73-101, July.
    10. Jess Benhabib & Pengfei Wang & Yi Wen, 2015. "Sentiments and Aggregate Demand Fluctuations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 83, pages 549-585, March.
    11. Michael Woodford, 2013. "Macroeconomic Analysis Without the Rational Expectations Hypothesis," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 5(1), pages 303-346, May.
    12. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2013. "Robust Predictions in Games With Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(4), pages 1251-1308, July.
    13. Duffy, John & Nagel, Rosemarie, 1997. "On the Robustness of Behaviour in Experimental "Beauty Contest" Games," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(445), pages 1684-1700, November.
    14. Gabaix, Xavier, 2016. "A Behavioral New Keynesian Model," CEPR Discussion Papers 11729, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    15. Lawrence Christiano & Martin Eichenbaum & Sergio Rebelo, 2011. "When Is the Government Spending Multiplier Large?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 119(1), pages 78-121.
    16. Jonathan Weinstein & Muhamet Yildiz, 2007. "A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(2), pages 365-400, March.
    17. Jeffrey R. Campbell & Charles L. Evans & Jonas D.M. Fisher & Alejandro Justiniano, 2012. "Macroeconomic Effects of Federal Reserve Forward Guidance," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 43(1 (Spring), pages 1-80.
    18. Gauti B. Eggertsson, 2010. "The paradox of toil," Staff Reports 433, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    19. Hellwig, Christian & Venkateswaran, Venky, 2009. "Setting the right prices for the wrong reasons," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(S), pages 57-77.
    20. Mariana Garcıa-Schmidt & Michael Woodford, "undated". "Are Low Interest Rates Deflationary? A Paradox of Perfect- Foresight Analysis," Working Papers Series 18, Institute for New Economic Thinking.
    21. Emmanuel Farhi & Ivan Werning, "undated". "Fiscal Multipliers: Liquidity Traps and Currency Unions," Working Paper 78556, Harvard University OpenScholar.
    22. Laura L. Veldkamp, 2011. "Information Choice in Macroeconomics and Finance," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 9621.
    23. Philippe Bacchetta & Eric Van Wincoop, 2006. "Can Information Heterogeneity Explain the Exchange Rate Determination Puzzle?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 552-576, June.
    24. Michael Woodford, 2011. "Simple Analytics of the Government Expenditure Multiplier," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(1), pages 1-35, January.
    25. Olivier Coibion & Yuriy Gorodnichenko, 2015. "Information Rigidity and the Expectations Formation Process: A Simple Framework and New Facts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(8), pages 2644-2678, August.
    26. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2006. "Inertia of Forward-Looking Expectations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(2), pages 152-157, May.
    27. George-Marios Angeletos & Luigi Iovino & Jennifer La'O, 2016. "Real Rigidity, Nominal Rigidity, and the Social Value of Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(1), pages 200-227, January.
    28. repec:cwl:cwldpp:1821rrr is not listed on IDEAS
    29. Alisdair McKay & Emi Nakamura & Jón Steinsson, 2016. "The Power of Forward Guidance Revisited," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(10), pages 3133-3158, October.
    30. Carlstrom, Charles T. & Fuerst, Timothy S. & Paustian, Matthias, 2012. "How inflationary is an extended period of low interest rates?," Working Paper 1202, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    31. P. Andrade & G. Gaballo & E. Mengus & B. Mojon, 2015. "Forward Guidance and Heterogeneous Beliefs," Working papers 573, Banque de France.
    32. Gaetano Gaballo, 2016. "Rational Inattention to News: The Perils of Forward Guidance," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(1), pages 42-97, January.
    33. Gauti B. Eggertsson & Michael Woodford, 2003. "The Zero Bound on Interest Rates and Optimal Monetary Policy," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 34(1), pages 139-235.
    34. Nagel, Rosemarie, 1995. "Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1313-1326, December.
    35. Gauti B. Eggertsson & Paul Krugman, 2012. "Debt, Deleveraging, and the Liquidity Trap: A Fisher-Minsky-Koo Approach," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 127(3), pages 1469-1513.
    36. Paul R. Krugman, 1998. "It's Baaack: Japan's Slump and the Return of the Liquidity Trap," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 29(2), pages 137-206.
    37. Alisdair McKay & Emi Nakamura & Jón Steinsson, 2017. "The Discounted Euler Equation: A Note," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 84(336), pages 820-831, October.
    38. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2013. "Robust Predictions in Games With Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(4), pages 1251-1308, July.
    39. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2007. "Optimal Communication," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 5(2-3), pages 594-602, 04-05.
    40. Lucas, Robert Jr., 1972. "Expectations and the neutrality of money," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 103-124, April.
    41. Marco Bassetto, 2015. "Forward Guidance: Communication, Commitment, or Both?," 2015 Meeting Papers 216, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    42. David P. Myatt & Chris Wallace, 2012. "Endogenous Information Acquisition in Coordination Games," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 79(1), pages 340-374.
    43. Iván Werning, 2015. "Incomplete Markets and Aggregate Demand," NBER Working Papers 21448, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    44. Sims, Christopher A., 2003. "Implications of rational inattention," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 665-690, April.
    45. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2002. "Social Value of Public Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1521-1534, December.
    46. Michael Woodford, 2012. "Methods of policy accommodation at the interest-rate lower bound," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 185-288.
    47. George-Marios Angeletos & Chen Lian, 2016. "Incomplete Information in Macroeconomics: Accommodating Frictions in Coordination," NBER Working Papers 22297, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    48. Guido Lorenzoni, 2009. "A Theory of Demand Shocks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 2050-2084, December.
    49. Chen Lian & George-Marios Angeletos, 2016. "Dampening General Equilibrium: From Micro Elasticities to Macro Effects," 2016 Meeting Papers 1456, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    50. Franklin Allen & Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2006. "Beauty Contests and Iterated Expectations in Asset Markets," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 19(3), pages 719-752.
    51. Narayana Kocherlakota, 2016. "Fragility of Purely Real Macroeconomic Models," NBER Working Papers 21866, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Mark Gertler, 2017. "Rethinking the Power of Forward Guidance: Lessons from Japan," IMES Discussion Paper Series 17-E-08, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan.
    2. Gerke, Rafael & Giesen, Sebastian & Kienzler, Daniel, 2018. "Uncertainty about QE effects when an interest rate peg is anticipated," Discussion Papers 12/2018, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    3. repec:aea:aecrev:v:108:y:2018:i:9:p:2477-2512 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. P. Andrade & G. Gaballo & E. Mengus & B. Mojon, 2015. "Forward Guidance and Heterogeneous Beliefs," Working papers 573, Banque de France.
    5. Lawrence J. Christiano, 2017. "Comment on "Michelson-Morley, Fisher, and Occam: The Radical Implications of Stable Quiet Inflation at the Zero Bound"," NBER Chapters,in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2017, volume 32, pages 227-245 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Gerke, Rafael & Giesen, Sebastian & Kienzler, Daniel & Tenhofen, Jörn, 2017. "Interest-rate pegs, central bank asset purchases and the reversal puzzle," Discussion Papers 21/2017, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    7. repec:eee:macchp:v2-1065 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Airaudo, Marco, 2017. "Temptation and Forward Guidance," School of Economics Working Paper Series 2017-4, LeBow College of Business, Drexel University.
    9. Jordi Galí, 2018. "Forward Guidance and the Exchange Rate," Working Papers 1021, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
    10. Xavier Gabaix, 2017. "Behavioral Inattention," NBER Working Papers 24096, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Jordi Galí, 2017. "Forward guidance and the exchange rate," Economics Working Papers 1600, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Feb 2018.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • E03 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - Behavioral Macroeconomics
    • E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
    • E43 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:red:sed017:89. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christian Zimmermann). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/sedddea.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.