Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information
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- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2013. "Robust Predictions in Games With Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(4), pages 1251-1308, July.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2013. "Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information," Working Papers 1457, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2011. "Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000275, David K. Levine.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2011. "Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1821R2, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Oct 2012.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2012. "Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000331, David K. Levine.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2011. "Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1821, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2011. "Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information," Working Papers 1356, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2012. "Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000601, David K. Levine.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2012. "Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information," Working Papers 1433, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2011. "Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1821R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Dec 2011.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2013. "Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000666, David K. Levine.
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More about this item
Keywords
Incomplete information; Correlated equilibrium; Robustness to private information; Moments restrictions; Identification; Informations bounds; Linear best responses; Quadratic payoffs;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Statistics
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