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Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited

  • FORGES, Françoise

A mistake in “Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information” motivates a re-examination of some extensions of the solution concept that Aumann introduced.

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File URL: http://alfresco.uclouvain.be/alfresco/download/attach/workspace/SpacesStore/effd6474-b253-45de-a596-67045fb405e4/coredp_2006_41.pdf
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Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 2006041.

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Date of creation: 00 May 2006
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Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2006041
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  1. R. Aumann, 2010. "Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies," Levine's Working Paper Archive 389, David K. Levine.
  2. Forges, Françoise & Koessler, Frédéric, 2005. "Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/168, Paris Dauphine University.
  3. F. Forges, 2010. "An Approach to Communication Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 516, David K. Levine.
  4. R. Aumann, 2010. "Correlated Equilibrium as an expression of Bayesian Rationality," Levine's Bibliography 513, UCLA Department of Economics.
  5. Ely, Jeffrey C. & Peski, Marcin, 2006. "Hierarchies of belief and interim rationalizability," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(1), pages 19-65, March.
  6. Dino Gerardi, 2002. "Unmediated Communication in Games with Complete and Incomplete Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1371, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  7. Peter Vida, 2005. "A Detail-free Mediator and the 3 Player Case," IEHAS Discussion Papers 0511, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
  8. Forges, F., 1987. "Universal mechanisms," CORE Discussion Papers 1987004, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  9. Ben-Porath, Elchanan, 2003. "Cheap talk in games with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 45-71, January.
  10. Françoise Forges, 2006. "Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information Revisited," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 61(4), pages 329-344, December.
  11. Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Interim Rationalizability," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000526, UCLA Department of Economics.
  12. FORGES , Françoise, 1993. "Five Legitimate Definitions of Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information," CORE Discussion Papers 1993009, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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