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Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information

  • Heller, Yuval
  • Solan, Eilon
  • Tomala, Tristan

This paper studies extensive form games with perfect information and simultaneous moves, henceforth called games with public information. On this class, we prove that all communication equilibrium payoffs can be obtained without mediator by cheap-talk procedures. The result encompasses repeated games and stochastic games.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25895/1/MPRA_paper_25895.pdf
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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/54905/1/MPRA_paper_25895.pdf
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 25895.

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Date of creation: 01 Jun 2010
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:25895
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  1. Forges, Francoise M, 1986. "An Approach to Communication Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(6), pages 1375-85, November.
  2. Dino Gerardi, 2002. "Unmediated Communication in Games with Complete and Incomplete Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1371, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  3. Dubey, Pradeep & Kaneko, Mamoru, 1985. "Information patterns and Nash equilibria in extensive games -- II," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 247-262, December.
  4. Forges, F., 1987. "Universal mechanisms," CORE Discussion Papers 1987004, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  5. Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2002. "Correlated Equilibrium in Stochastic Games," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/6019, Paris Dauphine University.
  6. Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 1998. "Correlated Equilibrium in Stochastic Games," Discussion Papers 1226, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  7. Joseph Farrell & Matthew Rabin, 1996. "Cheap Talk," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 103-118, Summer.
  8. Amparo Urbano & Jose E. Vila, 2002. "Computational Complexity and Communication: Coordination in Two-Player Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(5), pages 1893-1927, September.
  9. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, June.
  10. Heller, Yuval, 2005. "A minority-proof cheap-talk protocol," MPRA Paper 7716, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 26 Feb 2008.
  11. Ben-Porath, Elchanan, 2003. "Cheap talk in games with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 45-71, January.
  12. Aumann, Robert J., 1974. "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 67-96, March.
  13. V. Crawford & J. Sobel, 2010. "Strategic Information Transmission," Levine's Working Paper Archive 544, David K. Levine.
  14. Eilon Solan, 2001. "Characterization of correlated equilibria in stochastic games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 259-277.
  15. Renault, Jérôme & Tomala, Tristan, 2004. "Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/6103, Paris Dauphine University.
  16. Myerson, Roger B, 1986. "Multistage Games with Communication," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(2), pages 323-58, March.
  17. Pradeep Dubey & Mamoru Kaneko, 1983. "Information Patterns and Nash Equilibria in Extensive Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 676, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
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