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Sequential Equilibria in Bayesian Games with Communication

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Abstract

We study the effects of communication in Bayesian games when the players are sequentially rational but some combinations of types have zero probability. Not all communication equilibria can be implemented as sequential equilibria. We define the set of strong sequential equilibria (SSCE) and characterize it. SSCE differs from the concept of sequential communication equilibrium (SCE) defined by Myerson (1986) in that SCE allows the possibility of trembles by the mediator. We show that these two concepts coincide when there are three or more players, but the set of SSCE may be strictly smaller than the set of SCE for two-player games.

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  • Dino Gerardi & Roger B. Myerson, 2005. "Sequential Equilibria in Bayesian Games with Communication," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1542, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    • Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1542
    Note: CFP 1237.
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    Cited by:

    1. Izmalkov, Sergei & Lepinski, Matt & Micali, Silvio, 2011. "Perfect implementation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 121-140, January.
    2. Sebastian Schweighofer-Kodritsch & Roland Strausz, 2023. "Principled Mechanism Design with Evidence," Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers 0030, Berlin School of Economics.
    3. Balzer, Benjamin & Schneider, Johannes, 2023. "Mechanism design with informational punishment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 197-209.
    4. repec:dau:papers:123456789/5279 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Balzer, Benjamin & Schneider, Johannes, 2021. "Persuading to participate: Coordination on a standard," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    6. Correia-da-Silva, João, 2020. "Self-rejecting mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 434-457.
    7. Geffner, Ivan & Halpern, Joseph Y., 2024. "Communication games, sequential equilibrium, and mediators," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 221(C).
    8. Forges, Françoise & Ray, Indrajit, 2024. "“Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies”: Back to the roots," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(C).
    9. Sergei Izmalkov & Matt Lepinski & Silvio Micali, 2010. "Perfect Implementation," Working Papers w0140, New Economic School (NES).
    10. Dai Zusai, 2012. "Excess Liquidity against Predation," DETU Working Papers 1201, Department of Economics, Temple University.
    11. Ben-Porath, Elchanan & Dekel, Eddie & Lipman, Barton L., 2026. "Mechanism design for acquisition of/stochastic evidence," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), January.
    12. Forges, Françoise & Koessler, Frédéric & Salamanca, Andrés, 2024. "Interacting mechanisms: A perspective on generalized principal–agent problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(C).

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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