A minority-proof cheap-talk protocol
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- Heller, Yuval, 2010. "Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 394-400, July.
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Cited by:
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"A detail-free mediator,"
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- Vida, P ter & Azacis, Helmuts, 2012. "A Detail-Free Mediator," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2012/10, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
- Yuval Heller & Christoph Kuzmics, 2019. "Renegotiation and Coordination with Private Values," Graz Economics Papers 2019-10, University of Graz, Department of Economics.
- Heller, Yuval & Kuzmics, Christoph, 2020. "Communication, Renegotiation and Coordination with Private Values (Extended Version)," MPRA Paper 102926, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 26 Jul 2021.
- Heng Liu, 2017. "Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(4), pages 1037-1069, November.
- Heller, Yuval & Kuzmics, Christoph, 2024.
"Communication, renegotiation and coordination with private values,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 51-76.
- Yuval Heller & Christoph Kuzmics, 2020. "Communication, Renegotiation and Coordination with Private Values," Papers 2005.05713, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2023.
- Heller, Yuval & Solan, Eilon & Tomala, Tristan, 2012.
"Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 222-234.
- Heller, Yuval & Solan, Eilon & Tomala, Tristan, 2010. "Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information," MPRA Paper 25895, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Tristan Tomala & Yuval Heller & Eilon Solan, 2012. "Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information," Post-Print hal-00715606, HAL.
- Heller, Yuval, 2010. "All-stage strong correlated equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 184-188, May.
- Joseph Y. Halpern, 2007. "Computer Science and Game Theory: A Brief Survey," Papers cs/0703148, arXiv.org.
- Yuval Heller, 2012. "Sequential Correlated Equilibria in Stopping Games," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 60(1), pages 209-224, February.
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More about this item
Keywords
non-cooperative games; cheap-talk; correlated equilibrium; strong equilibrium; coalition-proof equilibrium; fault-tolerant distributed computation;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CMP-2008-03-15 (Computational Economics)
- NEP-CTA-2008-03-15 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-GTH-2008-03-15 (Game Theory)
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