IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/wpaper/halshs-00410457.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Correlated Equilibria, Incomplete Information and Coalitional Deviations

Author

Listed:
  • Francis Bloch

    (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Ecole Polytechnique - Centre d'Econométrie (CECO))

  • Bhaskar Dutta

    (University of Warwick [Coventry])

Abstract

This paper proposes new concepts of strong and coalition-proof correlated equilibria where agents form coalitions at the interim stage and share information about their recommendations in a credible way. When players deviate at the interim stage, coalition-proof correlated equilibria may fail to exist for two-player games. However, coalitionproof correlated equilibria always exist in dominance-solvable games and in games with positive externalities and binary actions.

Suggested Citation

  • Francis Bloch & Bhaskar Dutta, 2006. "Correlated Equilibria, Incomplete Information and Coalitional Deviations," Working Papers halshs-00410457, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00410457
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00410457
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00410457/document
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Maurice Salles, 2016. "Social choice," Chapters, in: Gilbert Faccarello & Heinz D. Kurz (ed.), Handbook on the History of Economic Analysis Volume III, chapter 36, pages 518-537, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, 1985. "Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(1), pages 70-83, Spring.
    3. Chwe Michael Suk-Young, 1994. "Farsighted Coalitional Stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 299-325, August.
    4. Barnett,William A. & Moulin,Hervé & Salles,Maurice & Schofield,Norman J. (ed.), 1995. "Social Choice, Welfare, and Ethics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521443401.
    5. Haimanko, Ori & Le Breton, Michel & Weber, Shlomo, 2004. "Voluntary formation of communities for the provision of public projects," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 115(1), pages 1-34, March.
    6. Ray, Indrajit, 1996. "Coalition-Proof Correlated Equilibrium: A Definition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 56-79, November.
    7. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1996. "Coalition-Proofness and Correlation with Arbitrary Communication Possibilities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 113-128, November.
    8. Moreno, Diego & Wooders, John, 1996. "Coalition-Proof Equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 80-112, November.
    9. Bernheim, B. Douglas & Peleg, Bezalel & Whinston, Michael D., 1987. "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-12, June.
    10. Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 1997. "Equilibrium Binding Agreements," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 30-78, March.
    11. Dutta, Bhaskar & Vohra, Rajiv, 2005. "Incomplete information, credibility and the core," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 148-165, September.
    12. Robert Wilson, 2005. "Information, efficiency, and the core of an economy," Studies in Economic Theory, in: Dionysius Glycopantis & Nicholas C. Yannelis (ed.), Differential Information Economies, pages 55-64, Springer.
    13. Indrajit Ray, 1998. "Correlated equilibrium as a stable standard of behavior," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 3(3), pages 257-269.
    14. Katz, Michael L & Shapiro, Carl, 1986. "Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 822-841, August.
    15. Konishi, Hideo & Le Breton, Michel & Weber, Shlomo, 1997. "Equilibria in a Model with Partial Rivalry," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 225-237, January.
    16. Konishi, Hideo & Le Breton, Michel & Weber, Shlomo, 1997. "Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium in a Group Formation Game with Positive Externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 161-182, October.
    17. Moulin, Herve, 1994. "Social choice," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 31, pages 1091-1125, Elsevier.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Heller, Yuval, 2010. "All-stage strong correlated equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 184-188, May.
    2. Heller, Yuval, 2010. "Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 394-400, July.
    3. Heller, Yuval, 2008. "Ex-ante and ex-post strong correlated equilbrium," MPRA Paper 7717, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 11 Mar 2008.
    4. Jobst Heitzig & Forest Simmons, 2012. "Some chance for consensus: voting methods for which consensus is an equilibrium," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 38(1), pages 43-57, January.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Heller, Yuval, 2008. "Ex-ante and ex-post strong correlated equilbrium," MPRA Paper 7717, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 11 Mar 2008.
    2. Heller, Yuval, 2010. "All-stage strong correlated equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 184-188, May.
    3. Heller, Yuval, 2010. "Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 394-400, July.
    4. Nicholas Ziros, 2011. "Negotiation-proof correlated equilibrium," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 14-2011, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
    5. Jobst Heitzig & Forest Simmons, 2012. "Some chance for consensus: voting methods for which consensus is an equilibrium," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 38(1), pages 43-57, January.
    6. Effrosyni Diamantoudi, 2003. "Equilibrium binding agreements under diverse behavioral assumptions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 22(2), pages 431-446, September.
    7. Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico & Vohra, Rajiv, 2002. "Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1-2), pages 1-41, September.
    8. Belleflamme, Paul, 2000. "Stable Coalition Structures with Open Membership and Asymmetric Firms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 1-21, January.
    9. Giraud, Gael & Rochon, Celine, 2002. "Consistent collusion-proofness and correlation in exchange economies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(4), pages 441-463, December.
    10. Moreno, Diego & Wooders, John, 1998. "An Experimental Study of Communication and Coordination in Noncooperative Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 24(1-2), pages 47-76, July.
    11. Sunde, Uwe & Jung, Florian, 2011. "Inequality, Development, and the Stability of Democracy -Lipset and Three Critical Junctures in German History," CEPR Discussion Papers 8406, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Ray, Indrajit, 1996. "Efficiency in correlated equilibrium," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 157-178, December.
    13. Kukushkin, Nikolai S., 1997. "An existence result for coalition-proof equilibrium," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 269-273, December.
    14. Le Breton, Michel & Weber, Shlomo, 2004. "Group Formation with Heterogeneous Sets," IDEI Working Papers 288, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    15. Grandjean, Gilles & Mantovani, Marco & Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, 2017. "Communication structure and coalition-proofness – Experimental evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 90-102.
    16. Stefan Ambec & Yann Kervinio, 2016. "Cooperative decision-making for the provision of a locally undesirable facility," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(1), pages 119-155, January.
    17. Arnold, Tone & Wooders, Myrna, 2002. "Dynamic Club Formation with Coordination," Economic Research Papers 269414, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    18. William A. Barnett, 2000. "Which Road Leads to Stable Money Demand?," Contributions to Economic Analysis, in: The Theory of Monetary Aggregation, pages 577-592, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
    19. Barnett, William A. & Keating, John W. & Kelly, Logan J., 2008. "Toward a bias corrected currency equivalent index," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(3), pages 448-451, September.
    20. Klaus, Bettina, 2011. "Competition and resource sensitivity in marriage and roommate markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 172-186, May.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    correlated equilibrium; coalitions; information sharing; games with positive externalities;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00410457. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.