IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cor/louvrp/1243.html

Efficiency in correlated equilibrium

Author

Listed:
  • RAY, I.

Abstract

We analyze all the existing efficiency criteria of mechanism design literature in the context of correlated equilibrium: ex-post (classical) efficiency, strong interim efficiency, weak interim (incentive) efficiency, posterior (informational) efficiency. The natural criterion of interior efficiency is introduced where obedience is not only Nash equilibrium but also Pareto efficient among the set of Nash equilibria in the induced extended game. All of these sets are compared to each other, analyzing several examples; the issue of (non)existence is also discussed. We characterize our efficient subsets of the set of correlated equilibria in terms of the existing notions of coalitionproofness in this context and show for two person games some notion of efficiency is the necessary and sufficient condition for the (corresponding) coalition-proofness. We discuss our concepts in non-canonical correlated devices also and prove the revelation principle in the context of ex-post, strong and weak interim efficiency, though it fails, even for two-player games, in the context of posterior and interior efficiency.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Ray, I., 1996. "Efficiency in correlated equilibrium," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1243, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:1243
    DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4896(96)00819-0
    Note: In : Mathematical Social Sciences, 32, 157-178, 1996
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a
    for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Forges, Françoise & Ray, Indrajit, 2024. "“Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies”: Back to the roots," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(C).
    2. Trivikram Dokka & Hervé Moulin & Indrajit Ray & Sonali SenGupta, 2023. "Equilibrium design in an n-player quadratic game," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 27(2), pages 419-438, June.
    3. Ozdogan, Ayca & Saglam, Ismail, 2021. "Correlated equilibrium under costly disobedience," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 98-104.
    4. Indrajit Ray, 2002. "Multiple Equilibrium Problem and Non-Canonical Correlation Devices," Working Papers 2002-24, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    5. Yohan Pelosse, 2024. "Correlated Equilibrium Strategies with Multiple Independent Randomization Devices," Working Papers 2024-05, Swansea University, School of Management.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:1243. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Alain GILLIS (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/coreebe.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.