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A Detail-Free Mediator

We present an extension to any finite complete information game with two players. In the extension, players are allowed to communicate directly and, additionally, send private messages to a simple, detail-free mediator, which, in turn, makes public announcements as a deterministic function of the private messages. The extension captures situations in which people engage in face-to-face communication and can observe the opponent's face during the conversation before choosing actions in some underlying game. We prove that the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs of the extended game approximately coincides with the set of correlated equilibrium payoffs of any underlying game.

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Paper provided by Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section in its series Cardiff Economics Working Papers with number E2012/10.

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Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: May 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cdf:wpaper:2012/10
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  1. Lehrer, Ehud & Sorin, Sylvain, 1997. "One-Shot Public Mediated Talk," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 131-148, August.
  2. FORGES, Françoise, . "Universal mechanisms," CORE Discussion Papers RP 914, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  3. Péter Vida & Francoise Forges, 2011. "Implementation of Communication Equilibria by Correlated Cheap Talk: The Two-Player Case," CESifo Working Paper Series 3360, CESifo Group Munich.
  4. Gossner, Olivier, 2000. "Comparison of Information Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 44-63, January.
  5. Amparo Urbano & Jose E. Vila, 2002. "Computational Complexity and Communication: Coordination in Two-Player Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(5), pages 1893-1927, September.
  6. Olivier Gossner & Nicolas Vieille, 2001. "Repeated communication through the mechanism," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 30(1), pages 41-60.
  7. R. Aumann, 2010. "Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies," Levine's Working Paper Archive 389, David K. Levine.
  8. Heller, Yuval, 2005. "A minority-proof cheap-talk protocol," MPRA Paper 7716, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 26 Feb 2008.
  9. GOSSNER, Olivier, . "Secure protocols or how communication generates correlation," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1361, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  10. Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2003. "Long Cheap Talk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(6), pages 1619-1660, November.
    • Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2002. "Long Cheap Talk," Discussion Paper Series dp284, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, revised Nov 2002.
  11. Ben-Porath, Elchanan, 2003. "Cheap talk in games with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 45-71, January.
  12. Vanessa Teague, 2008. "Problems With Coordination in Two-Player Games: Comment on "Computational Complexity and Communication"," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(6), pages 1559-1564, November.
  13. Robert J. Aumann, 1995. "Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262011476, December.
  14. Jarque, Xavier & Ponsati, Clara & Sakovics, Jozsef, 2003. "Mediation: incomplete information bargaining with filtered communication," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(7), pages 803-830, September.
  15. Lehrer, Ehud, 1991. "Internal Correlation in Repeated Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 19(4), pages 431-56.
  16. Cavaliere, Alberto, 2001. " Coordination and the Provision of Discrete Public Goods by Correlated Equilibria," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 3(3), pages 235-55.
  17. repec:dau:papers:123456789/6031 is not listed on IDEAS
  18. Ben-Porath, Elchanan, 1998. "Correlation without Mediation: Expanding the Set of Equilibrium Outcomes by "Cheap" Pre-play Procedures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 108-122, May.
  19. repec:dau:papers:123456789/6244 is not listed on IDEAS
  20. Gerardi, Dino, 2004. "Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 104-131, January.
  21. Amparo Urbano & Jose Vila, 2004. "Computationally restricted unmediated talk under incomplete information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 23(2), pages 283-320, January.
  22. Lehrer, Ehud, 1996. "Mediated Talk," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 25(2), pages 177-88.
  23. R. Vijay Krishna, 2004. "Communication in Games of Incomplete Information: The Two-player Case," ESE Discussion Papers 125, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
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