Learning the state of nature in repeated games with incomplete information and signals
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Renault, J. & Tomala, T., 1997.
"Repeated Proximity Games,"
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- GOSSNER, Olivier, 1997.
"Secure protocols or how communication generates correlation,"
CORE Discussion Papers
1997092, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Gossner, Olivier, 1998. "Secure Protocols or How Communication Generates Correlation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 83(1), pages 69-89, November.
- GOSSNER, Olivier, "undated". "Secure protocols or how communication generates correlation," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1361, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Robert J. Aumann, 1995. "Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262011476.
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- Sorin, Sylvain, 1992.
"Repeated games with complete information,"
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in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 4, pages 71-107
- Jérôme Renault, 2001. "3-player repeated games with lack of information on one side," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 30(2), pages 221-245.
- Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2002.
"Long Cheap Talk,"
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dp284, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, revised Nov 2002.
- Lehrer, Ehud & Sorin, Sylvain, 1997.
"One-Shot Public Mediated Talk,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 131-148, August.
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