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Repeated Proximity Games

Author

Listed:
  • Renault, J.
  • Tomala, T.

Abstract

We consider repeated games of complete information and imperfect monitoring, where the observation structure is given by a directed graph, i.e. all what a player learns are the actions taken by his neighbours on the graph. We prove that a generalized folk theorem holds if and only if the graph is 2-connected: this means that manipulation of information transmission by one player is impossible if and only if no player is essential for communication. We finally extend this result to the contexts of correlated equilibrium, sequential equilibrium and finitely repeated games.

Suggested Citation

  • Renault, J. & Tomala, T., 1997. "Repeated Proximity Games," Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications 97.14, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
  • Handle: RePEc:fth:pariem:97.14
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Nava, Francesco & Piccione, Michele, 2012. "Efficiency in repeated games with local interaction and uncertain local monitoring," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 54250, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    2. Marie Laclau, 2012. "Local Communication in Repeated Games with Local Monitoring," PSE Working Papers hal-01285070, HAL.
    3. Marie Laclau, 2012. "Local Communication in Repeated Games with Local Monitoring," Working Papers hal-01285070, HAL.
    4. Tomala, Tristan, 2009. "Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 682-694, November.
    5. Olivier Gossner & Rida Laraki & Tristan Tomala, 2004. "Maxmin computation and optimal correlation in repeated games with signals," Working Papers hal-00242940, HAL.
    6. repec:eee:gamebe:v:107:y:2018:i:c:p:220-237 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. repec:dau:papers:123456789/6102 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Markus Kinateder, 2006. "Repeated Games Played in a Network," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 674.06, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    9. Laclau, M., 2014. "Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 136-160.
    10. Renault, Jerome & Tomala, Tristan, 2004. "Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 313-344, November.
    11. Joyee Deb & Julio González Díaz & Jérôme Renault, 2013. "Uniform Folk Theorems in Repeated Anonymous Random Matching Games," Working Papers 13-16, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
    12. Laclau, M., 2013. "Repeated games with local monitoring and private communication," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 332-337.
    13. Nava, Francesco & Piccione, Michele, 2014. "Efficiency in repeated games with local interaction and uncertain local monitoring," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(1), January.
    14. Renault, Jerome & Tomala, Tristan, 2004. "Learning the state of nature in repeated games with incomplete information and signals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 124-156, April.
    15. Laclau, Marie, 2012. "A folk theorem for repeated games played on a network," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 711-737.
    16. Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2011. "General Properties of Long-Run Supergames," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 319-350, June.
    17. Yair Goldberg, 2003. "On the Minmax of Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring: A Computational Example," Discussion Paper Series dp345, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    GAMES;

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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