Repeated proximity games
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- Nava, Francesco & Piccione, Michele, 2012. "Efficiency in repeated games with local interaction and uncertain local monitoring," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 54250, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Marie Laclau, 2012. "Local Communication in Repeated Games with Local Monitoring," PSE Working Papers hal-01285070, HAL.
- Marie Laclau, 2012. "Local Communication in Repeated Games with Local Monitoring," Working Papers hal-01285070, HAL.
- Tomala, Tristan, 2009.
"Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 682-694, November.
- Tristan Tomala, 2009. "Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," Post-Print hal-00464537, HAL.
- Olivier Gossner & Rida Laraki & Tristan Tomala, 2004. "Maxmin computation and optimal correlation in repeated games with signals," Working Papers hal-00242940, HAL.
- repec:eee:gamebe:v:107:y:2018:i:c:p:220-237 is not listed on IDEAS
- repec:dau:papers:123456789/6102 is not listed on IDEAS
- Markus Kinateder, 2006. "Repeated Games Played in a Network," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 674.06, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Laclau, M., 2014.
"Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 136-160.
- Marie Laclau, 2014. "Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" halshs-01109156, HAL.
- Renault, Jerome & Tomala, Tristan, 2004. "Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 313-344, November.
- Joyee Deb & Julio González Díaz & Jérôme Renault, 2013. "Uniform Folk Theorems in Repeated Anonymous Random Matching Games," Working Papers 13-16, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Laclau, M., 2013. "Repeated games with local monitoring and private communication," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 332-337.
- Nava, Francesco & Piccione, Michele, 2014. "Efficiency in repeated games with local interaction and uncertain local monitoring," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(1), January.
- Renault, Jerome & Tomala, Tristan, 2004. "Learning the state of nature in repeated games with incomplete information and signals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 124-156, April.
- Laclau, Marie, 2012. "A folk theorem for repeated games played on a network," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 711-737.
- Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2011. "General Properties of Long-Run Supergames," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 319-350, June.
- Yair Goldberg, 2003. "On the Minmax of Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring: A Computational Example," Discussion Paper Series dp345, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
More about this item
KeywordsRepeated games · Folk theorem · imperfect monitoring · graphs;
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
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