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Repeated proximity games

  • JÊrÆme Renault


    (CERMSEM, UniversitÊ Paris 1, PanthÊon-Sorbonne, 106-112 Bd de l'HÆpital, F-75647 Paris Cedex 13, France)

  • Tristan Tomala


    (CERMSEM, UniversitÊ Paris 1, PanthÊon-Sorbonne, 106-112 Bd de l'HÆpital, F-75647 Paris Cedex 13, France)

We consider repeated games with complete information and imperfect monitoring, where each player is assigned a fixed subset of players and only observes the moves chosen by the players in this subset. This structure is naturally represented by a directed graph. We prove that a generalized folk theorem holds for any payoff function if and only if the graph is 2-connected, and then extend this result to the context of finitely repeated games.

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Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

Volume (Year): 27 (1998)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 539-559

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Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:27:y:1998:i:4:p:539-559
Note: Received June 1997/Revised version March 1998
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