Empirical Distributions of Beliefs Under Imperfect Observation
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DOI: 10.1287/moor.1050.0174
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- Olivier Gossner & Tristan Tomala, 2006. "Empirical Distributions of Beliefs Under Imperfect Observation," Post-Print hal-00487960, HAL.
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Citations
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- Antonio Cabrales & Olivier Gossner & Roberto Serrano, 2013. "Entropy and the Value of Information for Investors," Post-Print hal-00812682, HAL.
- Cabrales, Antonio & Gossner, Olivier & Serrano, Roberto, 2011. "Entropy and the value of information for investors," UC3M Working papers. Economics we1104, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
- Antonio Cabrales & Olivier Gossner & Roberto Serrano, 2010. "Entropy and the value of information for investors," Working Papers 2010-23, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
- Antonio Cabrales & Olivier Gossner & Roberto Serrano, 2013. "Entropy and the Value of Information for Investors," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" hal-00812682, HAL.
- Antonio Cabrales & Olivier Gossner & Roberto Serrano, 2013. "Entropy and the Value of Information for Investors," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-00812682, HAL.
- Antonio Cabrales & Olivier Gossner & Roberto Serrano, 2011. "Entropy and the value of information for investors," PSE Working Papers halshs-00648884, HAL.
- Antonio Cabrales & Olivier Gossner & Roberto Serrano, 2011. "Entropy and the value of information for investors," Working Papers halshs-00648884, HAL.
- Antonio Cabrales & Olivier Gossner & Roberto Serrano, 2010. "Entropy and the value of information for investors," Working Papers 2010-17, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Olivier Gossner & Tristan Tomala, 2007.
"Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring,"
Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 32(2), pages 413-424, May.
- Olivier Gossner & Tristan Tomala, 2007. "Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring," Post-Print hal-00487954, HAL.
- Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate, 2008.
"A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation, and Debt,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(1), pages 201-236, March.
- Marco Battaglini & Steve Coate, 2006. "A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001094, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate, 2007. "A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt," Discussion Papers 1441, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Stephen Coate & Marco Battaglini, 2007. "A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt," 2007 Meeting Papers 573, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate, 2006. "A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 321307000000000026, www.najecon.org.
- Battaglini, Marco & Coate, Stephen, 2007. "A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt," Working Papers 07-04, Cornell University, Center for Analytic Economics.
- Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate, 2006. "A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt," NBER Working Papers 12100, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Olivier Gossner & Rida Laraki & Tristan Tomala, 2004. "Maxmin computation and optimal correlation in repeated games with signals," Working Papers hal-00242940, HAL.
- Hernández, Penélope & Urbano, Amparo, 2008.
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Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 395-409, November.
- Amparo Urbano Salvador & Penélope Hernández Rojas, 2000. "Codification schemes and finite automata," Working Papers. Serie AD 2006-28, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Antonio Cabrales & Olivier Gossner & Roberto Serrano, 2013.
"Entropy and the Value of Information for Investors,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(1), pages 360-377, February.
- Antonio Cabrales & Olivier Gossner & Roberto Serrano, 2010. "Entropy and the value of information for investors," Working Papers 2010-17, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Antonio Cabrales & Olivier Gossner & Roberto Serrano, 2013. "Entropy and the Value of Information for Investors," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" hal-00812682, HAL.
- Cabrales, Antonio & Gossner, Olivier & Serrano, Roberto, 2011. "Entropy and the value of information for investors," UC3M Working papers. Economics we1104, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
- Antonio Cabrales & Olivier Gossner & Roberto Serrano, 2013. "Entropy and the Value of Information for Investors," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-00812682, HAL.
- Antonio Cabrales & Olivier Gossner & Roberto Serrano, 2011. "Entropy and the value of information for investors," PSE Working Papers halshs-00648884, HAL.
- Antonio Cabrales & Olivier Gossner & Roberto Serrano, 2011. "Entropy and the value of information for investors," Working Papers halshs-00648884, HAL.
- Antonio Cabrales & Olivier Gossner & Roberto Serrano, 2010. "Entropy and the value of information for investors," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000355, David K. Levine.
- Antonio Cabrales & Olivier Gossner & Roberto Serrano, 2010. "Entropy and the value of information for investors," Working Papers 2010-23, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
- Antonio Cabrales & Olivier Gossner & Roberto Serrano, 2013. "Entropy and the Value of Information for Investors," Post-Print hal-00812682, HAL.
- Gossner, Olivier & Hörner, Johannes, 2010.
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Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 63-84, January.
- Olivier Gossner & Johannes Hörner, 2010. "When is the lowest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff?," Post-Print halshs-00754488, HAL.
- Andrew Caplin & Daniel J. Martin, 2020. "Framing, Information, and Welfare," NBER Working Papers 27265, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Olivier Gossner & Jöhannes Horner, 2006. "When is the individually rational payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff?," Discussion Papers 1440, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Le Treust, Maël & Tomala, Tristan, 2019. "Persuasion with limited communication capacity," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
- Olivier Gossner & Penélope Hernández & Ron Peretz, 2016. "The complexity of interacting automata," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 45(1), pages 461-496, March.
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Keywords
stochastic process; signals; entropy; repeated games;All these keywords.
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