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General Properties of Long-Run Supergames

  • Jérôme Renault

    ()

  • Tristan Tomala

    ()

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s13235-011-0018-3
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Dynamic Games and Applications.

Volume (Year): 1 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 319-350

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Handle: RePEc:spr:dyngam:v:1:y:2011:i:2:p:319-350
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  1. Renault, Jérôme & Scarlatti, Sergio & Scarsini, Marco, 2005. "A folk theorem for minority games," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/6223, Paris Dauphine University.
  2. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine & Satoru Takahashi, 2004. "Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players are Patient," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000865, David K. Levine.
  3. JÊrÆme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 1998. "Repeated proximity games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 27(4), pages 539-559.
  4. R. Aumann, 2010. "Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies," Levine's Working Paper Archive 389, David K. Levine.
  5. Gossner, Olivier, 1995. "The Folk Theorem for Finitely Repeated Games with Mixed Strategies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 95-107.
  6. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 1991. "An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 26-47, June.
  7. Lehrer, Ehud, 1992. "On the Equilibrium Payoffs Set of Two Player Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 211-26.
  8. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-54, May.
  9. Fudenberg Drew & Levine David K., 1994. "Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 103-135, February.
  10. Renault, Jérôme & Scarlatti, Sergio & Scarsini, Marco, 2008. "Discounted and finitely repeated minority games with public signals," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 44-74, July.
  11. Ben-Porath, E. & Kahneman, M., 1993. "Communication in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring," Papers 15-93, Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies.
  12. Myerson, Roger B, 1986. "Multistage Games with Communication," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(2), pages 323-58, March.
  13. Forges, Francoise M, 1986. "An Approach to Communication Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(6), pages 1375-85, November.
  14. Michihiro Kandori & Hitoshi Matsushima, 1998. "Private Observation, Communication and Collusion," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 627-652, May.
  15. Renault, Jérôme, 2000. "On Two-Player Repeated Games with Lack of Information on One Side and State-Independent Signalling," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/6109, Paris Dauphine University.
  16. Lehrer, E, 1989. "Lower Equilibrium Payoffs in Two-Player Repeated Games with Non-observable Actions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 57-89.
  17. Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry, 2006. "Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195300796.
  18. Jeffrey C. Ely & Johannes Horner & Wojciech Olszewski, 2003. "Belief-free Equilibria in Repeated Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 666156000000000367, David K. Levine.
  19. Benoit, Jean-Pierre & Krishna, Vijay, 1985. "Finitely Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(4), pages 905-22, July.
  20. George J. Mailath & Steven A. Matthews & Tadashi Sekiguchi, 2001. "Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring," Penn CARESS Working Papers e7304519c6d1562163dbaf181, Penn Economics Department.
  21. Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K. & Maskin, E., 1989. "The Folk Theorem With Inperfect Public Information," Working papers 523, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  22. Renault, Jérôme, 2001. "3-player repeated games with lack of information on one side," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/6538, Paris Dauphine University.
  23. Forges, F. & Mertens, J. F. & Neyman, A., 1986. "A counterexample to the folk theorem with discounting," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 7-7.
  24. SORIN, Sylvain, 1988. "Repeated games with complete information," CORE Discussion Papers 1988022, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  25. Lehrer, E, 1990. "Nash Equilibria of n-Player Repeated Games with Semi-standard Information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 191-217.
  26. Tadashi Sekiguchi, 2005. "Uniqueness Of Equilibrium Payoffs In Finitely Repeated Games With Imperfect Monitoring," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 56(3), pages 317-331.
  27. Tomala, Tristan, 1999. "Nash Equilibria of Repeated Games with Observable Payoff Vectors," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 310-324, August.
  28. Tristan Tomala, 1998. "Pure equilibria of repeated games with public observation," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 93-109.
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