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On Repeated Games with Complete Information


  • Sylvain Sorin

    (Departement de Mathematique, Université Louis Pasteur 7, Rue René Descartes, 67084 Strasbourg, France)


We consider N person repeated games with complete information and standard signalling. We first prove several properties of the sets of feasible payoffs and Nash equilibrium payoffs for the n -stage game and for the (lambda)-discounted game. In the second part we determine the set of equilibrium payoffs for the Prisoner's Dilemma corresponding to the critical value of the discount factor.

Suggested Citation

  • Sylvain Sorin, 1986. "On Repeated Games with Complete Information," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 11(1), pages 147-160, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:11:y:1986:i:1:p:147-160
    DOI: 10.1287/moor.11.1.147

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