Communication in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring
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Other versions of this item:
- Ben-Porath, Elchanan & Kahneman, Michael, 1996. "Communication in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 281-297, August.
References listed on IDEAS
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ULB Institutional Repository
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Econometric Society, vol. 63(3), pages 621-646, May.
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- repec:fth:harver:1502 is not listed on IDEAS
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