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Repeated communication through the mechanism and

Author

Listed:
  • Nicolas Vieille

    (GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC - HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Olivier Gossner

Abstract

We consider the "and" communication device that receives inputs from two players and outputs the public signal yes if both messages are yes, and outputs no otherwise. We prove that no correlation can securely be implemented using this device, even when infinitely many stages of communication are allowed.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicolas Vieille & Olivier Gossner, 2001. "Repeated communication through the mechanism and," Post-Print hal-00465040, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00465040
    DOI: 10.1007/s001820100063
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal-hec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00465040
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gossner, Olivier, 1998. "Secure Protocols or How Communication Generates Correlation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 83(1), pages 69-89, November.
    2. Lehrer, Ehud & Sorin, Sylvain, 1997. "One-Shot Public Mediated Talk," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 131-148, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Vida, Péter & Forges, Françoise, 2013. "Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(1), January.
    2. Goltsman, Maria & Pavlov, Gregory, 2014. "Communication in Cournot oligopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 152-176.
    3. Olivier Gossner & Tristan Tomala, 2006. "Empirical Distributions of Beliefs Under Imperfect Observation," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 31(1), pages 13-30, February.
    4. Jérôme Renault, 2001. "Learning Sets in State Dependent Signalling Game Forms: A Characterization," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 26(4), pages 832-850, November.

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    Keywords

    Repeated communication; Mechanism And;

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