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Categorization and correlation in a random-matching game

Listed author(s):
  • Azrieli, Yaron

We consider a random-matching model in which every agent has a categorization (partition) of his potential opponents. In equilibrium, the strategy of each player i is a best response to the distribution of strategies of his opponents (when they face i) in each category of his categorization. We provide equivalence theorems between distributions generated by equilibrium profiles and correlated equilibria of the underlying game.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304-4068(09)00144-X
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.

Volume (Year): 46 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 (May)
Pages: 303-310

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Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:46:y:2010:i:3:p:303-310
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco

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  1. George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson & Avner Shaked, "undated". "Endogenous Inequality in Integrated Labor Markets with Two-sided Search," Penn CARESS Working Papers 90ff654ed11b714e3f7530c57, Penn Economics Department.
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  3. George J. mailath & Larry Samuelson & Avner Shaked, "undated". "Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions," ELSE working papers 030, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
  4. Jehiel, Philippe & Koessler, Frédéric, 2008. "Revisiting games of incomplete information with analogy-based expectations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 533-557, March.
  5. AUMANN, Robert J., "undated". "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies," CORE Discussion Papers RP 167, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  6. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1993. "Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 373, David K. Levine.
  7. M. Kandori & G. Mailath & R. Rob, 1999. "Learning, Mutation and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 500, David K. Levine.
  8. Azrieli, Yaron, 2009. "Categorizing others in a large game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 351-362, November.
  9. Aumann, Robert J, 1987. "Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(1), pages 1-18, January.
  10. Philippe Jehiel, 2005. "Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibrium," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000106, UCLA Department of Economics.
  11. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
  12. Okuno-Fujiwara Masahiro & Postlewaite Andrew, 1995. "Social Norms and Random Matching Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 79-109, April.
  13. Yaron Azrieli & Ehud Lehrer, 2004. "Categorization generated by prototypes -- an axiomatic approach," Game Theory and Information 0405003, EconWPA.
  14. Azrieli, Yaron, 2007. "Thinking categorically about others: A conjectural equilibrium approach," MPRA Paper 3843, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  15. P. Young, 1999. "The Evolution of Conventions," Levine's Working Paper Archive 485, David K. Levine.
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