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Evolutionarily Stable Correlation

  • Kam-Chau Wong
  • Chongmin Kim
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    Most existing results of evolutionary games restrict only to the Nash equilibrium. This paper introduces the analogue of evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) for correlated equilibria. We introduce a new notion of evolutionarily stable correlation (ESC) and prove that it generalizes ESS. We also study analogues of perfection (cf. Dhillon and Mertens (1994)), properness, and replicator dynamics for the correlation equilibrium and discuss their relationships with ESC

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    File URL: http://repec.org/esFEAM04/up.16804.1077678412.pdf
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    Paper provided by Econometric Society in its series Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings with number 495.

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    Date of creation: 11 Aug 2004
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    Handle: RePEc:ecm:feam04:495
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    1. Robert J. Aumann, 2010. "Correlated Equilibrium as an expression of Bayesian Rationality," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000377, David K. Levine.
    2. Dhillon, Amrita & Mertens, Jean Francois, 1996. "Perfect Correlated Equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 279-302, February.
    3. Forges, F., 1991. "Correlated equilibrium and sunspot equilibrium," CORE Discussion Papers 1991053, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    4. R. Myerson, 2010. "Refinement of the Nash Equilibrium Concept," Levine's Working Paper Archive 537, David K. Levine.
    5. Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-94, July.
    6. R. Aumann, 2010. "Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies," Levine's Working Paper Archive 389, David K. Levine.
    7. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 1997. "A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium," Game Theory and Information 9703006, EconWPA, revised 24 Mar 1997.
    8. George J. mailath & Larry Samuelson & Avner Shaked, . "Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions," ELSE working papers 030, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
    9. Jorgen W. Weibull, 1997. "Evolutionary Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262731215, June.
    10. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 1999. "Conditional Universal Consistency," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 104-130, October.
    11. Swinkels, J., 1991. "Evolutionary Stability with Equilibrium Entrants," Papers 9, Stanford - Institute for Thoretical Economics.
    12. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
    13. Cripps, Martin, 1991. "Correlated equilibria and evolutionary stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 428-434, December.
    14. Ianni, Antonella, 2001. "Learning correlated equilibria in population games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 271-294, November.
    15. Myerson, Roger B., 1994. "Communication, correlated equilibria and incentive compatibility," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 24, pages 827-847 Elsevier.
    16. Foster, Dean P. & Vohra, Rakesh V., 1997. "Calibrated Learning and Correlated Equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 40-55, October.
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