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Perfect correlated equilibria

Author

Listed:
  • DHILLON, A.
  • MERTENS, J.F.

Abstract

The ([ epsilon ] -) perfect correlated equilibria (P.C.E.) are those induced by a ([ epsilon ] -) perfect equilibrium of some correlation device. The "revelation principle" fails for this concept - the direct mechanism may not yield a perfect equilibrium. The approximately perfect correlated equilibria (A.P.C.E.) are the limits of [ epsilon ]-P.C.E., and we obtain a full characterisation for them. Even the A.P.C.E. are "acceptable". We argue on an example that, among those, these are the P.C.E. which seem the "right" concept.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Dhillon, A. & Mertens, J.F., 1996. "Perfect correlated equilibria," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1197, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:1197
    Note: In : Journal of Economic Theory, 68 (2), 279-302, 1996
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    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.0018
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    Cited by:

    1. Gerardi, Dino & Myerson, Roger B., 2007. "Sequential equilibria in Bayesian games with communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 104-134, July.
    2. Vida, Péter & Forges, Françoise, 2013. "Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(1), January.
    3. Yannick Viossat, 2010. "Properties and applications of dual reduction," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 44(1), pages 53-68, July.
    4. Kam-Chau Wong & Chongmin Kim, 2004. "Evolutionarily Stable Correlation," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 495, Econometric Society.
    5. Zhigang Cao, 2013. "Bargaining and cooperation in strategic form games with suspended realizations of threats," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 41(2), pages 337-358, July.
    6. Myerson, Roger B., 1997. "Dual Reduction and Elementary Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 183-202, October.
    7. Mertens, J. F., 2003. "The limit-price mechanism," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(5-6), pages 433-528, July.
    8. Shurojit Chatterji & Srihari Govindan, 2006. "Message spaces for perfect correlated equilibria," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 28(2), pages 475-479, June.
    9. repec:kap:theord:v:83:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s11238-017-9609-9 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Pavlo Prokopovych & Lones Smith, 2004. "Subgame Perfect Correlated Equilibria in Repeated Games," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 287, Econometric Society.
    11. John Hillas & Elon Kohlberg, 1996. "Foundations of Strategic Equilibrium," Game Theory and Information 9606002, EconWPA, revised 18 Sep 1996.
    12. Yannick Viossat, 2003. "Properties of Dual Reduction," Working Papers hal-00242992, HAL.
    13. Zhigang Cao, 2011. "Remarks on Bargaining and Cooperation in Strategic Form Games," Discussion Paper Series dp565, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    14. Gerardi, Dino, 2004. "Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 104-131, January.
    15. Edward Cartwright & Myrna Wooders, 2014. "Correlated Equilibrium, Conformity, and Stereotyping in Social Groups," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 16(5), pages 743-766, October.
    16. Dino Gerardi & Leeat Yariv, 2003. "Putting Your Ballot Where Your Mouth Is: An Analysis of Collective Choice with Communication," UCLA Economics Working Papers 827, UCLA Department of Economics.
    17. repec:dau:papers:123456789/3048 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Gerardi, Dino & Yariv, Leeat, 2007. "Deliberative voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 317-338, May.
    19. Rabah Amir & Sergei Belkov & Igor V. Evstigneev, 2017. "Correlated equilibrium in a nutshell," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 83(4), pages 457-468, December.

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