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Noisy Communication and the Evolution of Cooperation

Listed author(s):
  • Bhaskar, V.

No abstract is available for this item.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022-0531(98)92423-1
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 82 (1998)
Issue (Month): 1 (September)
Pages: 110-131

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:82:y:1998:i:1:p:110-131
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Y. G. Kim & J. Sobel, 2010. "An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-play Communication," Levine's Working Paper Archive 374, David K. Levine.
  2. A. Matsui, 2010. "Cheap-Talk and Cooperation in a Society," Levine's Working Paper Archive 536, David K. Levine.
  3. Hurkens, Sjaak, 1996. "Multi-sided Pre-play Communication by Burning Money," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 186-197, April.
  4. Bhaskar, V., 1995. "On the neutral stability of mixed strategies in asymmetric contests," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 273-284, December.
  5. Farrell, Joseph, 1986. "Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt4968n3fz, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  6. Sobel, Joel, 1993. "Evolutionary stability and efficiency," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 42(2-3), pages 301-312.
  7. Warneryd, Karl, 1991. "Evolutionary stability in unanimity games with cheap talk," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 375-378, August.
  8. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
  9. Robson, A.J., 1989. "Efficiency In Evolutionary Games: Darwin, Nash And Secret Handshake," Papers 89-22, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
  10. Kim, Y.G. & Sobel, J., 1993. "An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-Play Communication," Working Papers 93-02, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
  11. P. Young, 1999. "The Evolution of Conventions," Levine's Working Paper Archive 485, David K. Levine.
  12. Selten, Reinhard, 1983. "Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 269-363, September.
  13. Samuelson, Larry, 1993. "Recent advances in evolutionary economics: comments," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 42(2-3), pages 313-319.
  14. Matsui, Akihiko, 1991. "Cheap-talk and cooperation in a society," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 245-258, August.
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