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Noisy Communication and the Evolution of Cooperation

  • Bhaskar, V.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WJ3-45J5B56-10/2/9cdffc6ea8f684eff760db22a3856830
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 82 (1998)
Issue (Month): 1 (September)
Pages: 110-131

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:82:y:1998:i:1:p:110-131
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

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  1. Samuelson, Larry, 1993. "Recent advances in evolutionary economics: comments," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 42(2-3), pages 313-319.
  2. Bhaskar, V., 1995. "On the neutral stability of mixed strategies in asymmetric contests," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 273-284, December.
  3. Robson, A.J., 1989. "Efficiency In Evolutionary Games: Darwin, Nash And Secret Handshake," Papers 89-22, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
  4. Hurkens, Sjaak, 1996. "Multi-sided Pre-play Communication by Burning Money," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 186-197, April.
  5. Warneryd, Karl, 1991. "Evolutionary stability in unanimity games with cheap talk," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 375-378, August.
  6. Farrell, Joseph, 1986. "Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt4968n3fz, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  7. Matsui, Akihiko, 1991. "Cheap-talk and cooperation in a society," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 245-258, August.
  8. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
  9. P. Young, 1999. "The Evolution of Conventions," Levine's Working Paper Archive 485, David K. Levine.
  10. Y. G. Kim & J. Sobel, 2010. "An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-play Communication," Levine's Working Paper Archive 374, David K. Levine.
  11. Kim, Y.G. & Sobel, J., 1993. "An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-Play Communication," Working Papers 93-02, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
  12. Selten, Reinhard, 1983. "Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 269-363, September.
  13. Sobel, Joel, 1993. "Evolutionary stability and efficiency," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 42(2-3), pages 301-312.
  14. A. Matsui, 2010. "Cheap-Talk and Cooperation in a Society," Levine's Working Paper Archive 536, David K. Levine.
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