Cheap-Talk and Cooperation in a Society
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Cited by:
- Osano, Hiroshi, 1997. "An Evolutionary Model of Corporate Governance and Employment Contracts," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 403-436, September.
- Blume, Andreas & Ortmann, Andreas, 2007. "The effects of costless pre-play communication: Experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 274-290, January.
- Arvan, Lanny & Cabral, Luis & Santos, Vasco, 1999. "Meaningful cheap talk must improve equilibrium payoffs," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 97-106, January.
- Bhaskar, V., 1998. "Noisy Communication and the Evolution of Cooperation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 110-131, September.
- Dai, Darong, 2012. "On the Existence and Stability of Pareto Optimal Endogenous Matching with Fairness," MPRA Paper 40560, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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