Robert Aumann's and Thomas Schelling's Contributions to Game Theory: Analyses of Conflict and Cooperation
Advanced information on the Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2005.
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- Sergiu Hart, 2005.
"An Interview with Robert Aumann,"
Discussion Paper Series
dp386, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjostrom, 2003.
"Arms Races and Negotiations,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
618897000000000766, David K. Levine.
- Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjostrom, 2001. "Arms Races and Negotiations," Economics Working Papers 0007, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
- Balinga, Sandeep & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2001. "Arms Races and Negotiations," Working Papers 3-01-2, Pennsylvania State University, Department of Economics.
- Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjostrom, 2001. "Arms Races and Negotiations," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 391749000000000005, www.najecon.org.
- Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjostrom, 2001. "Arms Races and Negotiations," Levine's Working Paper Archive 391749000000000005, David K. Levine.
- Güth, W. & Ritzberger, K. & van Damme, E.E.C., 2004.
"On the Nash Bargaining Solution with noise,"
Other publications TiSEM
2def5ecc-d422-4c00-b049-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Schelling, Thomas C, 1969. "Models of Segregation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(2), pages 488-493, May.
- Mehta, Judith & Starmer, Chris & Sugden, Robert, 1994. "The Nature of Salience: An Experimental Investigation of Pure Coordination Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 658-673, June.
- Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, September.
- Jeffrey C. Ely & Johannes Hörner & Wojciech Olszewski, 2005.
"Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games,"
Econometric Society, vol. 73(2), pages 377-415, 03.
- R. J. Aumann & M. Kurz & A. Neyman, 1983. "Voting for Public Goods," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(4), pages 677-693.
- Friedman, James W, 1979. "Non-Cooperative Equilibria for Exit Supergames," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 20(1), pages 147-156, February.
- Aumann, Robert J. & Sorin, Sylvain, 1989. "Cooperation and bounded recall," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 5-39, March.
- Abreu, Dilip & Dutta, Prajit K & Smith, Lones, 1994. "The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A NEU Condition," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 939-948, July.
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