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Robert Aumann's and Thomas Schelling's Contributions to Game Theory: Analyses of Conflict and Cooperation

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  • Committee, Nobel Prize

    (Nobel Prize Committee)

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    Abstract

    Advanced information on the Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2005.

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    File URL: http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2005/advanced-economicsciences2005.pdf
    File Function: Full text
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    Paper provided by Nobel Prize Committee in its series Nobel Prize in Economics documents with number 2005-1.

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    Length: 30 pages
    Date of creation: 10 Oct 2005
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:ris:nobelp:2005_001
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.nobelprize.org

    Keywords: Game Theory;

    Find related papers by JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General

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    1. Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjostrom, 2001. "Arms Races and Negotiations," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 391749000000000005, www.najecon.org.
    2. Jeffrey C. Ely & Johannes Horner & Wojciech Olszewski, 2003. "Belief-free Equilibria in Repeated Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 666156000000000367, David K. Levine.
    3. Sergiu Hart, 2005. "An Interview with Robert Aumann," Discussion Paper Series dp386, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    4. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, June.
    5. Guth, Werner & Ritzberger, Klaus & van Damme, Eric, 2004. "On the Nash bargaining solution with noise," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 697-713, June.
    6. Schelling, Thomas C, 1969. "Models of Segregation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(2), pages 488-93, May.
    7. Aumann, Robert J. & Sorin, Sylvain, 1989. "Cooperation and bounded recall," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 5-39, March.
    8. Mehta, Judith & Starmer, Chris & Sugden, Robert, 1994. "The Nature of Salience: An Experimental Investigation of Pure Coordination Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 658-73, June.
    9. Friedman, James W, 1979. "Non-Cooperative Equilibria for Exit Supergames," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 20(1), pages 147-56, February.
    10. Abreu, Dilip & Dutta, Prajit K & Smith, Lones, 1994. "The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A NEU Condition," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 939-48, July.
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