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Voting for Public Goods

Author

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  • R. J. Aumann
  • M. Kurz
  • A. Neyman

Abstract

It is shown that when resources are privately owned, the institution of voting is irrelevant to the choice of non-exclusive public goods: the total bundle of such goods produced by Society is the same whether or not minority coalitions are permitted to produce them. This is in sharp contrast to the cases of redistribution and of exclusive public goods, where public decisions depend strongly on the vote. The analytic tool used is the Harsanyi-Shapley non-transferable utility value.

Suggested Citation

  • R. J. Aumann & M. Kurz & A. Neyman, 1983. "Voting for Public Goods," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(4), pages 677-693.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:50:y:1983:i:4:p:677-693.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/2297769
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    Cited by:

    1. Abraham Neyman & Rann Smorodinsky, 2004. "Asymptotic Values of Vector Measure Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 29(4), pages 739-775, November.
    2. Committee, Nobel Prize, 2005. "Robert Aumann's and Thomas Schelling's Contributions to Game Theory: Analyses of Conflict and Cooperation," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2005-1, Nobel Prize Committee.

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