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The legacy of Herbert Simon in game theory

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  • Sent, Esther-Mirjam

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  • Sent, Esther-Mirjam, 2004. "The legacy of Herbert Simon in game theory," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 303-317, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:53:y:2004:i:3:p:303-317
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    1. Kreps, David M. & Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 245-252, August.
    2. George J. Mailath, 1998. "Corrigenda [Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons from Evolutionary Game Theory]," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(4), pages 1941-1941, December.
    3. Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1993. "Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1019-1045, September.
    4. Pearce, David G, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-1050, July.
    5. Neyman, Abraham, 1985. "Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 227-229.
    6. Cho, In-Koo, 1994. "Bounded Rationality, Neural Network and Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 4(6), pages 935-957, October.
    7. George J. Mailath, 1998. "Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons from Evolutionary Game Theory," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(3), pages 1347-1374, September.
    8. John Conlisk, 1996. "Why Bounded Rationality?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(2), pages 669-700, June.
    9. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1007-1028, July.
    10. Tan, Tommy Chin-Chiu & da Costa Werlang, Sergio Ribeiro, 1988. "The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 370-391, August.
    11. Aumann, Robert J., 1997. "Rationality and Bounded Rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 2-14, October.
    12. Aumann, Robert J. & Sorin, Sylvain, 1989. "Cooperation and bounded recall," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 5-39, March.
    13. Crawford Vincent P., 1993. "Adaptive Dynamics, Part II," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 509-513, October.
    14. Sent, Esther-Mirjam, 1997. "Sargent versus Simon: Bounded Rationality Unbound," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(3), pages 323-338, May.
    15. Rosenthal, Robert W., 1981. "Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 92-100, August.
    16. Binmore, Ken, 1987. "Modeling Rational Players: Part I," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 3(02), pages 179-214, October.
    17. Milgrom, Paul & Stokey, Nancy, 1982. "Information, trade and common knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 17-27, February.
    18. Simon, Herbert A, 1979. "Rational Decision Making in Business Organizations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(4), pages 493-513, September.
    19. Reny Philip J., 1993. "Common Belief and the Theory of Games with Perfect Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 257-274, April.
    20. Binmore, Ken, 1988. "Modeling Rational Players: Part II," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 4(01), pages 9-55, April.
    21. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1986. "Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 83-96, June.
    22. Herbert Simon, 1956. "A comparison of game theory and learning theory," Psychometrika, Springer;The Psychometric Society, vol. 21(3), pages 267-272, September.
    23. Samuelson, Larry, 1992. "Dominated strategies and common knowledge," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 284-313, April.
    24. Lewis, Alain A., 1992. "Some aspects of effectively constructive mathematics that are relevant to the foundations of neoclassical mathematical economics and theory of games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 24(2-3), pages 209-235, November.
    25. Simon, Herbert A. & Schaeffer, Jonathan, 1992. "The game of chess," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 1, pages 1-17 Elsevier.
    26. Rizvi, S Abu Turab, 1994. "Game Theory to the Rescue?," Contributions to Political Economy, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(0), pages 1-28.
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    Cited by:

    1. Estrada, Fernando, 2010. "Economics and Rationality of organizations: an approach to the work of Herbert A. Simon," MPRA Paper 21811, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Kreye, M.E. & Goh, Y.M. & Newnes, L.B. & Goodwin, P., 2012. "Approaches to displaying information to assist decisions under uncertainty," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 40(6), pages 682-692.

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