Monotone Games with Positive Spillovers
No abstract is available for this item.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Leslie M. Marx & Steven A. Matthews, 2000.
"Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Oxford University Press, vol. 67(2), pages 327-358.
- Leslie M. Marx & Steven A. Matthews, "undated". "Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project," Penn CARESS Working Papers 6f8dbf67d492ff8a10975496b, Penn Economics Department.
- Leslie M. Marx & Steven A. Matthews, "undated". ""Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project''," CARESS Working Papres 99-01, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
- Leslie M. Marx & Steven A. Matthews, 1997. "Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project," Discussion Papers 1188, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Aumann, Robert J. & Sorin, Sylvain, 1989. "Cooperation and bounded recall," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 5-39, March.
- Russell Cooper & Andrew John, 1988. "Coordinating Coordination Failures in Keynesian Models," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 103(3), pages 441-463.
- Anat R. Admati & Motty Perry, 1991. "Joint Projects without Commitment," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 58(2), pages 259-276.
- Roger Lagunoff & Akihiko Matsui, "undated". ""An 'Anti-Folk Theorem' for a Class of Asynchronously Repeated Games''," CARESS Working Papres 95-15, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
- Gale, Douglas, 1995. "Dynamic Coordination Games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 5(1), pages 1-18, January.
- Gale, D., 1992. "Dynamic Coordiantion Games," Papers 13, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- Kurz, Mordecai, 1978. "Altruism as an Outcome of Social Interaction," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 68(2), pages 216-222, May. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:37:y:2001:i:2:p:295-320. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.